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Abstract
Minorities continue to be severely underrepresented at the top levels of most occupations
despite making dramatic gains in initial access to them. This fact is particularly striking in the
legal profession where blacks are well represented in each associate class yet face significantly
lower probabilities of making partner. To explain this divergence in the career paths of blacks
and whites, I develop a dynamic model of statistical discrimination in which firms diversify
their workforce by lowering the hiring standard for blacks. Despite such a diversity goal at
hiring, task assignment and promotion decisions are not constrained by this policy. Under
such institutional setting, the model predicts that although blacks are more likely to be hired
compared to observably similar whites, they are more likely to be placed in worse tasks and less
likely to be promoted conditional on the same set of observables. However, conditional on task
assignment, blacks and whites face similar promotion rates.
I test the model’s predictions using new data from the After the JD study – a unique
longitudinal survey tracking the professional lives of more than 4,000 lawyers. Compared to
whites of similar credentials, blacks are much more likely to be hired into the best law firms.
However, they are assigned to worse tasks and are less likely to be a partner. This black-white
difference in promotion rates can be explained by quality differences in task assignments early
in the associates’ careers even controlling for measures of effort and career preferences. Results
from this paper provide a unique explanation for the underrepresentation of minorities at the
top of professional ladders by revealing how incompatible strategies in job assignment can reduce
the number of minority promotions compared to the case without affirmative action.
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In large, national law firms, the most pressing issues have probably shifted from hiring
and initial access to problems concerning the terms and conditions of employment,
especially promotion to partnership.1
1 Introduction
Minorities continue to be severely underrepresented at the top levels of most occupations despite
making dramatic gains in initial access to these professions. This large gap between minority hiring
and promotion rates is particularly striking in the market for lawyers. In the last three decades,
there has been a steady increase in the number of racial minorities entering the legal field. In 1984,
racial minorities made up only 8.6 percent of the law school graduating class, but by 2008, they
represented twenty-two percent of all J.D. recipients. Coupled with this rising trend in minority law
school enrollment, large corporate law firms have proactively recruited minority lawyers in response
to public scrutiny regarding staff diversity.2 Consequently, the racial breakdown of associates in
large law firms is fairly representative of the graduating law school class. Panel A in Table 1 shows
that in 2009, minorities made up close to 20 percent of all associates, with greater proportions
working in bigger law firms.3 However, as shown in Panel B, the racial composition of partners
tells a dramatically different story with minorities making up only 4.5 to just over 7 percent of
partners across all firm sizes.4
In this paper, I develop a dynamic model of statistical discrimination to understand this gap
between minority representation at the top and lower levels of the professional ladder. My model
incorporates hiring, task assignment, and promotion in the presence of a firm-wide hiring policy
that raises the hiring rates of a minority group (e.g. black). Despite such a diversity goal at
hiring, task assignment and promotion decisions are not constrained by this policy. Within such
an institutional framework, the model predicts that although blacks are more likely to be hired
than observably similar whites, blacks are assigned to worse tasks even conditional on the same
set of observables. Since better tasks allow associates to develop skills necessary for promotion
1Diversity in Law Firms. (2003). U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
2A number of legal organizations routinely publish “Diversity Score Cards” based on the number of minority
attorneys in major law firms. For example, see Diversity Score Card 2010 published by the American Lawyer
at http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202444469087 These reports are widely discussed and
referenced by those in the legal field and media.
3In 2009, minorities made up just below 22% of all J.D.’s awarded and blacks about 6%.
4Cohort effect may be a part of the explanation behind this gap between minority/black representation at the
associate and partner levels. Associates typically reach partnership eligibility after 7 years with the firm, and minority
gains at the associate level takes time to trickle up to the partnership level. However, minority representation among
partners in 2009 is still well below the percent of minority J.D.s 25 years earlier. Therefore, cohort effect cannot be
the main explanation for the persisting gap between hiring and promotion of minorities.
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Table 1: Racial Demographics of Associates and Partners at U.S. Law Firms in 2009
Panel A: Associates
Firm Size (# of lawyers) Total % All Minorities % Black
50 or fewer 1,468 14.31 2.45
51-100 3,317 15.19 3.32
101-250 10,105 15.83 4.40
251-500 10,655 17.02 4.85
501-700 7,295 18.78 4.69
701+ 30,328 22.85 4.93
Total 63,168 19.67 4.66
Panel B: Partners
Firm Size (# of lawyers) Total % All Minorities % Black
50 or fewer 2,116 5.25 0.95
51-100 5,234 5.81 1.15
101-250 14,756 4.52 1.32
251-500 12,502 5.34 1.80
501-700 6,821 6.35 2.02
701+ 20,392 7.63 2.05
Total 61,821 6.05 1.71
Source: Women and Minorities in Law Firms by Race and Ethnicity. (January 2010). NALP Bulletin. Retrieved August 23,
2010 from http://www.nalp.org/race_ethn_jan2010.
more easily, blacks will be much less likely to become a partner compared to whites with similar
credentials. Yet conditional on the task assignment, blacks and whites should face similar promotion
rates. I test the model’s predictions using new data from the After the J.D. Study – a nationally
representative survey of lawyers who entered the bar in year 2000 – and find support for all my
predictions.
The motivation for my model’s institutional framework originates from two prevailing expla-
nations in the legal field for the underrepresentation of minorities among partners, especially for
black lawyers. First, in a highly controversial study that has received much public criticism, Sander
(2008) argues that in an effort to achieve diversity within the hiring class, elite law firms hire blacks
with much lower credentials than whites noting that “Black students, who make up 1 to 2 percent of
students with high grades...make up 8 percent of corporate law firm hires.”5 Sander’s assertion that
the underrepresentation of blacks in partnership is merely a reflection of their lack of qualifications
is a common argument used to explain the scarcity of minorities at the top of other professional
ladders.
However, most of Sander’s critics suggest that there may be more complex sources of high
attrition and low partnership among black lawyers. In particular, they highlight the distinction
between an institutional hiring process and partner-directed work assignment and training.
5Lawyers Debate Why Blacks Lag at Major Firms. New York Times, November 29, 2006.
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Critics generally concede the raw numbers. But they offer different reasons for the gap
between hiring and promotion. Some point to old-fashioned racism. Others say that
firms act institutionally in hiring but leave work assignments to individual partners.
Those partners often provide poor training, rote assignments and little mentoring to
minority lawyers.6
There may be a number of explanations for the presence of firm-wide diversity efforts at hiring.
Minorities may improve the firm’s general image and reputation and attract better job applicants.
For example, a number of legal organizations routinely publish reports called “diversity score cards”
ranking major law firms based on the number of minority attorneys.7 These reports are highly cited
by legal publications and frequently referenced by potential clients and job applicants. Furthermore,
law schools may be particularly interested in improving the initial placements of their minority
graduates and may foster close, mutually beneficial ties with law firms who actively recruit and
hire minorities. Additionally, if the firm is ultimately concerned with increasing the number of
minorities at the senior level, raising their representation at the junior rank is one simple strategy
it can follow.
However, task assignment and promotion may not reflect such diversity efforts at hiring for a
variety of reasons. First, as suggested by those in the legal profession, firms may act institutionally
in hiring while job assignments are decentralized to individual partners. In large firms, especially, a
central hiring committee of seniors and individuals from the human resources group set recruiting
and hiring agendas. To increase the diversity of its hiring class, the firm might choose to increase the
number of minorities hired by decreasing their hiring standard below that of whites (“affirmative
action”). Senior/partners know that affirmative action has been used in hiring, and therefore,
minority hires are less qualified than members of the majority group on average. Then these
partners may be more likely to offer rote assignments and little mentoring to minorities. Since the
hiring committee cannot fully oversee or dictate the daily interactions between the seniors and the
new hires, it may not be able to counter these tendencies.
Second, although law schools are able to monitor the first professional placements of their
graduates closely, most schools do not track their students throughout their careers. Consequently,
school support for minority graduates may be short-lived, and law school ties to law firms are more
likely to be based on the initial hiring of their graduates rather than on the specific conditions
of their employment or career advancements. Third, despite minorities’ value to the firm’s image
and public relations, skills that are seen as important for partnership (e.g. client-building) are
often deemed “culturally white”. This may be due to customer biases or the lack of social/business
6Ibid.
7See Figure A.1 in the Appendix for an example of a diversity score card.
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networks from which minorities can draw potential clients. For any combination of these reasons
and others, task assignments and promotion may reflect the firm’s efforts to diversify its hiring
class.
Under this institutional setting, the basic intuition of my theoretical model is as follows. Sup-
pose firms are only able to observe a noisy signal of the job candidate’s qualifications and his/her
group identity: black or white. Because firms are interested in increasing the number of black hires,
they will lower the signal threshold above which they will hire a black candidate below the cut-off
for whites. The partners responsible for task assignments know that there are now more unqualified
workers among the black hires and than among the whites hires. Therefore, they will require a
higher signal from the black hires to assign them to the more challenging task (“promotion-track”).
Affirmative action, together with a higher standard for promotion track assignment, implies that
a greater proportion of the black hires are unqualified and assigned to the non-promotion track
compared to observably similar whites. Only qualified workers in the promotion track gain the nec-
essary skills for partnership even conditional on observable measures of worker quality. Therefore,
promotion rates among the hired blacks will be lower compared to their white peers. However,
conditional on being assigned to the promotion track, a similar proportion of blacks and whites
should be qualified and promoted.
In the second half of this paper, I bring the model’s predictions to the After the JD Study (AJD),
a new longitudinal survey that tracks the professional lives of over 4,000 lawyers who entered the
bar in year 2000. This unique dataset has not been used previously in economic research, partly
because the second wave has only been released to the public in the summer of 2010. In the AJD, I
focus on black and white differences and find the following results. One, conditional on observable
credentials (e.g. GPA, law school ranking, law review), black lawyers are 7 to 30 percentage points
more likely to be hired at the largest law firms.8 Two, conditional on being hired, blacks are
much less likely to be formulating strategies with partners or supervising other attorneys, and they
also face significantly lower promotion rates than whites. Sander’s simple model of affirmative
action can explain these two predictions about hiring and promotion. Three, even conditional on
these observable skill signals, these black-white differences in task assignments and promotion still
remain. Note that this prediction is not consistent with the simple model of affirmative action
but is consistent with a model of statistical discrimination. Four, conditional on task assignment,
black and white associates have statistically equal promotion rates. These findings are robust to
controlling for measures of effort and career preferences. Together these results are consistent with
a model of affirmative action in the presence of statistical discrimination that leads to worse task
assignment for blacks, but conditional on being assigned to more complex tasks, blacks and whites
8These magnitudes vary across GPA-law school tier categories.
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are similarly qualified. This is the essence of my model.
The contributions of this paper are varied. First, I develop a new perspective on discrimination
and diversity across job levels by analyzing the consequences of a diversity-seeking institutional hir-
ing process and decentralized task assignment and promotion within a dynamic model of statistical
discrimination. Second, to my knowledge, this is the first study that empirically demonstrates the
connection between worse task assignments and lower promotion rates of blacks by taking advan-
tage of a unique dataset containing information about employment conditions and career paths of
lawyers.9 Finally, although I frame the main discussion in the context of lawyers, the applications
of the model and its predictions are not limited to the legal field. This paper contributes to the
wider discussion regarding minority underrepresentation at the managerial and executive ranks by
revealing how incompatible strategies in job assignments and promotion can reverse the intended
goals of diversity programs early in the careers of minorities.
2 Related Theoretical Literature
The theoretical model in this paper builds on the statistical discrimination literature in which firms
use observable characteristics (e.g. race, sex) that are correlated with worker productivity when
they only have noisy information about the job applicant’s true qualifications. If group A’s mean
productivity is lower on average than group B’s and the productivity signal is equally informative
for both groups, Phelps (1972) shows that the expected productivity conditional on the signal will
be lower for group A.10
The basic structure of my model is most closely related to Coate and Loury (1993) and Fryer
(2007). The former considers the effect of affirmative action on the employer’s negative stereotypes
by building upon Arrow’s (1972) earlier work. In their model, employer’s lower ex-ante evaluations
of minority workers’ qualifications result in their being assigned to the skilled-job less frequently for
a given level of investment. This negative stereotype results in the minority group facing a lower
return to human capital investment, and in equilibrium, generates self-confirming stereotypes. The
central part of Coate and Loury’s model is the introduction of affirmative action that requires
the same rate of assignment to the skilled-job for the two groups. Under such a policy, there
are equilibria in which affirmative action moves the economy to a state of homogeneous beliefs,
but there is also a “patronizing equilibrium” in which the anti-discrimination policy lowers the
standard for the minority group, decreasing the return to human capital investment, and widening
9Most empirical studies examining the shortage of minorities at the top of the professional ladder have focused on
gender differences rather than racial differences. For example, see Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller (1997), McDowell,
Singell, and Ziliak (1999), and Blau and DeVaro (2007).
10For a detailed summary of the statistical discrimination literature, see Fang and Moro’s (2010) review.
6
Job Assignment and Promotion Under Statistical Discrimination Jee-Yeon K. Lehmann
the ex-post differences in productivity.
In one of the first explicitly dynamic models of statistical discrimination, Fryer (2007) incorpo-
rates aspects of Coate and Loury (2003) in developing a two-stage job assignment game to assess
the impact of negative stereotypes at the time of the worker’s labor market entry on the evolution
of his career. In the paper, Fryer focuses on developing sufficient conditions for “belief-flipping” to
arise in a dynamic equilibrium in which one group is subjected to negative stereotypes in the hiring
stage, but once hired, the successful members of that group are more likely to be promoted.
My model differs from Fryer (2007) in the following ways. In Fryer, blacks are discriminated
against early in their career, but if the conditions for “belief-flipping” are met, they face higher
promotion rates. However, the opposite pattern holds true in many occupations, including law
firms. Furthermore, whether conditions for belief-flipping hold or not, Fryer’s model cannot account
for the higher hiring rates for blacks that we observe in the market for lawyers. In my model, I
introduce a unique institutional framework in which firms abide by a diversity program at hiring
yet task assignment and promotion decisions are entirely profit-driven. Under such a setup, blacks
face higher hiring rates yet have lower chances for promotion even conditional on observables.
Finally, the empirical objective of this paper is most closely related to Bjerk (2008). In his
model, Bjerk shows that if worker groups differ in their average skill level and/or the precision or
the frequency of their skill signals prior to entering the labor market, equally skilled workers from
different groups will have varying likelihood of making it to the top jobs. The intuition behind
Bjerk’s result is as follows. Suppose workers have one of two skill levels (high or low) and three
job levels (low, career, and director) into which the workers can be hired or promoted. Low-skill
workers are most productive at the lowest job and least productive at the director level. The
opposite is true for the high-skill worker. Firms do not directly observe the worker’s skill level,
but update their initial beliefs about the workers by observing the track record of each worker
at his job or signals that each worker can emit before the labor market or at the low job level.
Under these assumptions, firms set two critical levels of belief thresholds for hiring or promoting
the worker into the two highest job levels. If group the fraction of skilled worker in A is lower than
B or if firms acquire information about B more rapidly than A, then it will take individuals from
A longer to be hired or promoted to the higher job levels than equally skilled members of group
B. Therefore, individuals in A will be underrepresented in these jobs relative to their proportion
among the highly skilled.
As with Fryer, although we can explain the underrepresentation of the less skilled group at the
top using Bjerk’s model, we cannot account for their higher hiring rates. A hiring policy that forces
firms to over-hire from the less skilled group is necessary to explain why blacks might face lower
hiring standards than whites as we observe in the AJD.
7
Job Assignment and Promotion Under Statistical Discrimination Jee-Yeon K. Lehmann
3 A Dynamic Model of Job Assignment and Promotion Under
Statistical Discrimination
In this section, I introduce a dynamic model of statistical discrimination in the presence of a policy
that raises the hiring rates of blacks above that of whites – a policy that I refer to as “affirmative
action”. In the setup, I adopt much of the language and notations of Coate and Loury (1993) and
Fryer (2007) for ease of comparison and interpretation.
The basic sequence of events is as follows:
1. Nature chooses the applicant’s group j ∈ {B,W} and his type t ∈ {qualified(q),unqualified(u)}.
2. The firm sees a noisy signal φ ∈ [0, 1] of the applicant’s type and chooses to lower the signal
hiring standard for group B below that of W .
3. Each partner sees a noisy signal θ ∈ [0, 1] of the hired worker’s type and places the worker
into one of two tracks.
4. Worker invests towards promotion.
5. Workers’ type are revealed and only qualified workers who invested are promoted. All other
workers are let go.
3.1 Formal Model Setup
3.1.1 Hiring
Consider a large number of identical firms and a large population of workers belonging to one of
two groups j ∈ {B,W}. For each worker i, nature assigns his group membership and his type
t ∈ {qualified(q), unqualified(u)}. The fraction of qualified workers in the population pi is the same
for both B and W . Firms are randomly matched with many workers. For each worker i, the firm
also observes his group identity j and a noisy signal of his type φ ∈ [0, 1].
Let Hq(φ) and Hu(φ) be the distribution of φ for a qualified and an unqualified worker, respec-
tively. The associated density functions are hq(φ) and hu(φ). Assume that Hq(φ) ≤ Hu(φ) for all
φ. Therefore, higher values of the signal are more likely if the worker is qualified, and for a given
prior, the posterior likelihood that a worker is qualified is larger if his signal takes a higher value.
The central hiring committee wants to diversify their workforce by increasing the representation
of B in their hiring class. It achieves this by lowering the signal hiring standard sHB < s
H
W , choosing
to hire the worker from group j if and only if his signal φ is greater than or equal to sHj .
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3.1.2 Assignment into Promotion Track versus Non-promotion Track
The interpretation of the track assignment can be rather broad. For example, the two tracks can
be distinguished by quality differences in the tasks associated with them. The promotion track is
characterized by more demanding and rewarding task assignments while the non-promotion track
is defined by rote tasks and unchallenging/unsatisfying work. We can also interpret the track
assignment as the decision whether to mentor and prepare the worker for promotion or not. In
reality, the two tracks are probably differentiated by a combination of quality differences in both
tasks and mentoring. The important criterion for our analysis is that the firm’s benefit (cost) from
assigning a qualified (unqualified) worker to the promotion track is higher than the non-promotion
track.
After the worker is hired, he/she is matched with a senior or partner who observes a signal
θ ∈ [0, 1] of the worker’s type. θ is distributed according to Fq(θ) and Fu(θ) with associated density
functions fq(θ) and fu(θ). We define a likelihood ratio ϕ(θ) ≡ fu(θ)/fq(θ) and assume that it is
strictly decreasing in θ. Similar to φ, this implies that Fq(θ) ≤ Fu(θ) for all θ. Based on θ and the
worker’s group membership, the firm decides whether to place him/her in the promotion track or
the non-promotion track.
In both tracks, I assume that employers earn a positive return from the worker only if the worker
is qualified. Otherwise, all workers would be hired. Wages are determined exogenously, and the
worker receives a gross benefit of w regardless of his track assignment. This assumption on wages
makes particular sense in the context of large corporate law firms where financial compensation for
associates is determined in a lockstep fashion with each associate class receiving the same salary
and bonuses each year they are with the firm. Furthermore, as long as one’s track assignment is
not fully verifiable to the worker and to the outside firms, wages conditional on track assignments
should be non-contractable. For example, suppose workers demand higher wages in the promotion
track. Then firms have an incentive to lie about the assignment as long the worker cannot tell
clearly which track he is in. On the other hand, if some workers are willing to take lower wages
to be in the promotion track, then for workers with low enough signals, firms have an incentive to
place them in the non-promotion track while claiming they are on the promotion track. Therefore,
if the quality differences between the two tracks are subtle enough, wages cannot be credibly tied
to task assignments.
In theory, qualified workers may be able to additionally signal their type by working longer
hours. However, in my data, both black and white lawyers work long hours, and their hours are
not statistically different. This is consistent with Landers, Rebitzer, and Taylor (1996) in which the
law firm’s reliance upon work hours as an indicator of the associate’s quality leads to a “rat-race”
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Table 2: Firm Net Payoff by Track Assignment and Worker Type
Qualified Unqualified
Promotion-track xPq −xPu
Non-promotion-track xNq −xNu
equilibrium in which all lawyers overwork early in their careers.
Table 2 describes the firm’s net return from a worker of a given type across the two task
assignments. The relation among the payoffs can be summarized as xPq > x
N
q > 0 > −xNu > −xPu .
In other words, while the firm’s benefit from correctly assigning a qualified worker to the promotion
track is greater than the non-promotion track, the cost of an unqualified worker is also higher in
the promotion track.
3.1.3 Promotion
Once hired, the worker decides whether to invest toward promotion or not. The cost of his efforts
depends on the task to which he is assigned. I assume that the investment cost in the promotion
track (cP ) is lower than in the non-promotion track (cN ). One can interpret these investment costs
as the cost of any additional effort required beyond regular duties (whether in intensity or scope)
that one must put in to prove himself to be promotion-worthy. cP is lower than cN , because tasks in
the promotion track garner more recognition from seniors and/or active mentoring provide better
preparation for partnership.
Before the promotion decision, workers’ types are revealed, and only qualified workers who
invested for partnership are promoted. All unqualified workers and qualified workers who did not
invest towards promotion are let go. If the worker is promoted, he receives a gross payoff of W > w
and the firm gains a net payoff of X > xPq . Qualified workers who are not promoted receive w
outside the firm, and unqualified worker’s outside earning is normalized to zero. The final payoff
to each agent is the sum of the payoffs in each period with no discounting.
3.2 Strategies & Equilibria
3.2.1 Worker Investment Towards Promotion
Let’s start with the worker’s investment decision for promotion. He will work toward promotion if
only if his cost of investment is less than or equal to his expected gain from promotion. I assume
that an unqualified worker’s cost is sufficiently high such that he will never invest for promotion.
10
Job Assignment and Promotion Under Statistical Discrimination Jee-Yeon K. Lehmann
A qualified worker will invest if and only if his cost is less than or equal to W −w. In the analysis
below, I assume that it is only optimal for the qualified, promotion-track workers to invest towards
promotion.
Assumption 1. Only qualified, promotion-track workers invest towards promotion:
cP < W − w < cN . (1)
This assumption streamlines our definition of strategies and equilibria by allowing us to define
two standards for a given pi and set of payoffs rather than four. At the end of the theoretical section,
I describe the equilibria when qualified workers in both tracks invest toward promotion. Reality
will fall somewhere between these two extremes if workers in either track have a distribution of
investment costs.
3.2.2 Task assignment
Each partner knows that an affirmative action has been used at hiring and that the proportion of
qualified among the black hires is lower than among the white hires. Based on the hiring standard
sHj , each partner calculates a posterior probability pi
H
j that a random worker belonging to group j
is qualified:
piHj ≡
pi[1−Hq(sHj )]
pi[1−Hq(sHj )] + (1− pi)[1−Hu(sHj )]
. (2)
Since sHB < s
H
W , it is easy to see that pi
H
B < pi
H
W .
Based on piHj and observed signal θ, each partner formulates a posterior probability, denoted
Ψ(piHj , θ), using Bayes’ Rule, that the worker is qualified, given by
Ψ(piHj , θ) ≡
piHj fq(θ)
piHj fq(θ) + (1− piHj )fu(θ)
=
1
1 + [(1− piHj )/piHj ]ϕ(θ)
. (3)
Based on Ψ(piHj , θ), we can formulate the firm’s expected payoff from assigning a worker be-
longing to group j to the promotion track given θ and pij as
Ψ(piHj , θ)(x
P
q +X)− [1−Ψ(piHj , θ)]xPu . (4)
We can also specify the expected payoff from assigning a worker to the non-promotion track given
11
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Figure 1: Signal Standards and Task Assignment
θ and piHj as
Ψ(piHj , θ)x
N
q − [1−Ψ(piHj , θ)]xNu . (5)
Therefore, conditional on (4) being non-negative, the firm will assign him to the promotion-track
if and only if
Ψ(piHj , θ)(x
P
q +X)− [1−Ψ(piHj , θ)]xPu ≥ Ψ(piHj , θ)(xNq )− [1−Ψ(piHj , θ)]xNu . (6)
Using our definition of Ψ(piHj , θ), we can rewrite (6) as
xPq +X − xNq
xPu − xNu
≥ 1− pi
H
j
piHj
ϕ(θ). (7)
Given our assumption of a monotone likelihood ratio, the partner chooses a threshold value
of the signal sPj and assigns to the promotion track a worker from a group j if and only if that
worker’s signal θ is greater than or equal to sPj :
sPj ≡ min
{
θ ∈ [0, 1]
xPq +X − xNq
xPu − xNu
≥ 1− pi
H
j
piHj
ϕ(θ)
}
. (8)
Therefore, as illustrated in Figure 1, a worker who is hired with a signal above sHj will be placed
into the non-promotion track if his θ < sPj and placed into the promotion track if his θ ≥ sPj .
To guarantee that there will be a range of signal θ ∈ [0, 1] that some hired workers from both
groups will be placed into the non-promotion track, we need the following assumption.
Assumption 2. ϕ(θ) is continuous, strictly decreasing, and strictly positive on [0,1] and
xNq
xNu
>
xPq +X
xPu
.
Assumption 2 assures that for each piHj , the standard for being placed into the promotion track
is always higher than the standard for the non-promotion track. Additionally, if it is profitable
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for the firm to hire any worker, some workers are guaranteed to be placed into the non-promotion
track. Intuitively, Assumption 2 requires that the benefit of assigning a qualified worker to the
promotion track (xPq ) is not extremely high compared to assigning him to the non-promotion track
(xNq ). If not, firms may rely on a highly risky strategy in which they place everyone (even those
with a very low signal) into the promotion track.
3.2.3 Equilibrium
From the definition of sPj in (8), we can simplify all payoffs as a function of
xNq
xNu
. Let xPq +X = kqx
N
q
and xPu = kux
N
u and let K =
kq−1
ku−1 .
Definition 1. Under Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, an equilibrium of the game is a pair of
standards sPj for a set of hiring standards s
H
j , j ∈ {B,W} such that
sPj ≡ min
{
θ ∈ [0, 1]
KxNq
xNu
≥ 1− pi
H
j
piHj
ϕ(θ)
}
(9)
where piHj is defined in (2) and 0 < K < 1.
Assumption 2 ensures K < 1 which implies that the relative loss from unqualified workers in
the promotion track versus non-promotion track is greater than the relative gain from qualified
workers. Figure 2 illustrates how the promotion track standards are determined.
In Definition 1, we can see that sPj is decreasing in pi
P
j . Therefore, if the hiring standard for
group B is lower than for W , workers from B will face a higher signal standard for the promotion
track as illustrated in Figure 2. Consequently, affirmative action at hiring negatively impacts B
workers with a signal between sPW and s
P
B who would have been placed into the promotion track in
the absence of this policy.
Note that as K increases, the promotion track standard decreases. As the firm’s benefit from a
qualified worker increases relative to the the firm’s cost from an unqualified worker in the promotion
track, the expected net payoff from a worker with a given θ also increases. Therefore, each partner
can afford to take a chance on workers with lower signals in the promotion track.
We can now define two terms that will help us characterize some useful properties of the
equilibrium.
Definition 2. The group hiring rate h(piHj ) is defined as the probability that a worker from
population j is hired or
h(sHj ) ≡ pi[1−Hq(sHj )] + (1− pi)[1−Hu(sHj )]. (10)
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Figure 2: Promotion Track Standards When sHB < s
H
W
Definition 3. The internal promotion rate P (piHj ) is the probability that from a worker from
group j will be promoted conditional on being hired or
P (piHj ) = pi
H
j [1− Fq(sPj )]. (11)
If the firm lower the hiring standard for B such that sHB < s
H
W , then it is easy to see that the
hiring rate for B will be greater than for W . Furthermore, a lower hiring standard implies that a
smaller proportion of the B hires will be qualified, and partners will set a higher promotion track
standard for B than for W . Since only qualified workers in the promotion track are promoted, the
internal promotion rate for B will be lower than for W .
3.2.4 When Qualified Workers in the Non-promotion Track Invest for Promotion
Suppose Assumption 1 fails and qualified workers in the non-promotion track choose to invest for
promotion: cP < cN < W − w. This change in the worker’s investment behavior increases the
standard for the promotion track for both B and W since the additional benefit from placing a
qualified worker in the promotion track rather than the non-promotion track is now smaller.
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More specifically, when qualified workers in the non-promotion track invest, the benefit from the
qualified workers assigned to non-promotion track increases by X. The promotion track standard
will now be defined by
sˆPj ≡ min
{
θ ∈ [0, 1]
Kˆ xNq
xNu
≥ 1− pi
H
j
piHj
ϕ(θ)
}
and (12)
where Kˆ =
kˆq−1
ku−1 and x
P
q = kˆqx
N
q . Since kˆq < kq, we can see that Kˆ < K. This implies that for
both groups of worker, the promotion standard is now higher than in the case when only qualified
workers in the promotion track invested. However, the promotion track standard will remain higher
for B than W as long as sHB < s
H
W .
When only qualified worker in the promotion track invest, B’s promotion rate is lower than
W ’s promotion rate for two related reason. One, affirmative action at hiring implies that there is
a greater proportion of unqualified workers among the B hires than W . Two, because of this fact,
partners set a higher promotion track standard. B’s promotion rate is lower, because only qualified
workers in the promotion track invest for promotion. When qualified workers in the non-promotion
also invest, lower promotion rates of B is entirely due to increase in the fraction of unqualified B
hires.
Reality will likely fall between these two assumptions, and the lower promotion rates of B’s
will be explained by a combination of these two factors. Workers probably face a distribution of
investment costs depending on their type and track assignment with higher costs being more likely
in the non-promotion track such that GP (c) ≥ GN (c).
Note that when qualified workers in the non-promotion track invest, affirmative action can
actually lead to an increase in the number of promoted workers compared to the case without such
a policy. If the firm’s main goal in affirmative action is increasing the greater number B partners,
then affirmative action at hiring could be a viable strategy even when B’s task assignment and
promotion rate are negatively impacted by the policy. The overall welfare implication of affirmative
action is unclear and will depend on one, the relative size of the benefits and losses to B workers who
would not have been hired without affirmative action, and two, the size of the losses to workers who
would have been placed in the promotion track in the absence of affirmative action. This second
group of workers would lose out on being promoted in the case where only qualified worker in the
promotion track invest. In the more general case with a distribution of investment costs, these
workers have to put in a greater effort or time to be promoted and some may not find the higher
cost worthwhile.
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4 Empirical Predictions
Suppose the firms hold to a policy that lowers the hiring standard for blacks. However, task
assignment and promotion decisions are left to the discretion of individual partners. Below is a
summary of the main empirical predictions on hiring, task assignment, and promotion that we can
draw from the model.
1. Conditional on signals of his/her qualification, blacks are more likely to be hired.
2. Conditional on being hired, blacks have worse task assignments and lower promotion rates.
3. Conditional on signals of his/her qualification, hired blacks have worse task assignments and
promotion rates.
4. Conditional on task assignment, black and white differences in promotion rates could be
reduced, eliminated, or reversed.
It is easy to deduce the first two predictions from a simple model of affirmative action. Predic-
tion 1 follows immediately from our assumption that firms are guided by a policy that lowers the
hiring standard for blacks below that of whites. If affirmative action did not exist at hiring, then
the opposite would hold. Affirmative action increases the fraction of unqualified workers among the
black hires relative to whites, increasing the promotion track standard for blacks above the stan-
dard for whites. Therefore, conditional on being hired, blacks should be assigned to the promotion
track less frequently than whites and promoted less (prediction 2).
However, without a model in which beliefs about the hired workers are negatively colored by
the lower hiring standards for blacks, there should not be significant differences in task assignment
or promotion for observably similar blacks and whites. Therefore, prediction 3 is consistent with
my model of statistical discrimination, because all hired workers are negatively stigmatized by
affirmative action. Furthermore, because investment costs for promotion are lower in the promotion
track, black hires should be promoted less even conditional on observable credentials.
Conditional on task assignments, predictions about black and white differences in promotion
rates require a little more explanation. Black and white workers in the margin between the two
task assignments have the same probability of being qualified conditional on their signal and group
membership.
First, let’s consider the non-promotion track. Suppose investment cost is too high for qualified
workers assigned to the non-promotion track, and they do not invest for promotion. Then blacks
and whites in this lower track should both have zero probability of making partner, and there would
be no difference in the promotion rates. On the other hand, suppose that qualified workers in the
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non-promotion track choose to invest for partnership. Then blacks will have lower promotion rates
than whites, because a greater proportion of the blacks in the non-promotion track are likely to be
unqualified and ineligible for promotion.
Now let’s consider the promotion rates conditional on being assigned to the promotion track.
The promotion rates of blacks in the promotion track can be larger than the promotion rates of
whites if piHB is much smaller than pi
H
W (or equivalently if s
H
B is much lower than s
H
W ) and there
is a large cost to placing an unqualified worker into the promotion track. Then for a given set of
firm payoffs, the promotion track standard for blacks will be much higher than the standard for
whites. Consequently, a greater proportion of blacks in the promotion track will be qualified and
promoted compared to whites in the same track. However, if the cost of an unqualified worker in
the promotion track is very high, then the promotion track standard will be extremely strict for
both blacks and whites. Although we would still predict a higher promotion probability for blacks
in this case, in practice, there would be little difference in the promotion rates in this group of
extremely qualified individuals. On the other hand, if the cost of placing an unqualified worker
in the promotion track is low, then the firm will set a similarly low promotion track standard for
both whites and blacks. Then above this low signal threshold, a higher proportion of whites may
actually be qualified than blacks given a reasonable difference between sHB and s
H
W .
5 Typical Structure of a Large Corporate Law Firm
Before we bring these predictions to data, it will be helpful for us to understand the basic structure
of law firms. Figure 3 shows major positions within a typical corporate law firm.
Newly minted J.D.’s are usually hired as junior associates who may be promoted to the rank of
senior associates after 3 or 4 years with the firm. A small percentage of newly minted J.D.’s is hired
into contract or staff attorney positions. Contract attorneys are fixed-term or part-time positions
and the need for their position is evaluated frequently (case-by-case, monthly, or yearly). Staff
attorneys tend to be more permanent positions but with lower pay and benefits than associates.
The most important distinction between associates and contract/staff attorneys is that associates
are eligible for partnership while contract and staff attorneys are not.
Financial compensation for associates in large firms is typically determined by a lockstep system
in which all associates within the same hiring class receive the same base salary and bonus for each
year with the firm.11 Evaluation for promotion also tend to follow a lockstep system with each
11It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss why large firms rely on such a system. Typical arguments in
favor of a lockstep compensation scheme include reduction of internal competition within firms, maintenance of a
single company philosophy, and incentives for associates to take on whatever tasks that are necessary to move the
case forward. However, it has been criticized for its inefficiencies and the reduction of incentives for performance
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Figure 3: Typical Structure of A Large Corporate Law Firm
hiring class of associates being “up for partnership” at the same time. On average, associates
go through the formal evaluation process for partnership after about 6 to 9 years with the firm.
The hierarchy of positions above the associate level differs across firms. In some firms, senior
associates are promoted to a transitional position of counsel, of-counsel, or special counsel before
being evaluated for partnership. In others, there is a more direct path to partnership from the
associate level, and the position of counsel is given to those senior associates who do not make
partner or are laterally recruited from other firms with no real prospects for partnership. Recently,
an increasing number of firms have moved to a two-tiered partnership model that differentiates
between equity and non-equity partners. Equity partners have an ownership stake in the firm and
share in its profits while non-equity partners are paid a fixed salary (albeit higher than associates)
with limited voting rights. Most large firms have an “up-or-out” policy in which associates who do
enhancement. In response to the recent economic crisis, a few firms have abandoned this fixed salary system and
moved towards a merit-based compensation scheme.
18
Job Assignment and Promotion Under Statistical Discrimination Jee-Yeon K. Lehmann
not make partner are required to leave the firm.12
Lawyers report that the requirements for partnership have been rising in the last few years with
a greater focus on the applicant’s ability to show that he/she can generate business for the firm.
This often requires the backing of at least a few strong earning partners to be willing to share credit
with the associate or to use their client/industry connections to help foster business building skills
in the associate. Cultivating contacts by participating in professional organizations, not-for-profit
groups, and speaking at seminars as associates can also help in future business development and
serve as a signal to the firm that the associate is actively interested in client development.13
6 After the JD Study
I test the empirical predictions outlined in Section 4 using data from the After the JD Study (AJD),
a unique longitudinal survey that tracks the professional lives of over 4,000 lawyers who entered
the bar in year 2000. The AJD was commissioned by the American Bar Association in conjunction
with the National Association for Law Placement (NALP) to study the career choices of lawyers
during the first ten years of their legal careers. The first wave of the AJD was administered in 2002
and the second wave in late 2007. The third and final wave is scheduled for 2012.
The first wave of the AJD contains 3,905 valid responses from the nationally representative
sample and 633 responses from the minority oversample. These numbers represent a response
rate of 71%. Section A.1 in the Appendix details the creation of AJD’s nationally representative
sample. There is a potential for selection bias if those who responded to the questionnaires are
systematically different from those in the original sample who chose not to participate in the survey.
However, as evidenced by Table 3, the demographic characteristics of the AJD respondents closely
match that of young lawyers in the 2000 Census both in their racial and sex composition and, to the
extent practice setting can be inferred from census data, the distribution of lawyers across sectors
(After the JD, 2004).
The AJD asks about the respondent’s current employment, which includes one’s sector of
practice, average hours worked, salary, employer size, job/task assignments, satisfaction on the
job and being a lawyer in general, and plans to leave the firm. The survey also contains detailed
information on the respondent’s educational background, performance, and debt. Finally, the
12There are several explanations for why law firms might use such a policy. Rebitzer and Taylor (2007) argue
that “up-or-out” promotion contests emerge naturally from a setting in which there is an absence of clear property
rights over key assets, for example knowledge. In a model of asymmetric learning and promotion incentives, Ghosh
and Waldman (2010) find that firms employ up-or-out contracts when firm-specific human capital is low and when
commitment to a wage floor is feasible and effort provision is important.
13Associates Learn to Start Building That Book of Business. Chicago Lawyer, May 2004.
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Table 3: Distribution of the AJD National Sample with by Sex and Race
AJD National Sample National Comparison
Count Percent Count Percent
Female 1,725 46.3 19,409 46.9
Male 2,005 53.8 22,777 54.0
Total 3,730 42,186
White 3,033 79.9 126,888 81.7
Black 215 5.7 9,410 6.1
Hispanic 146 3.9 6,482 4.2
Asian 247 6.5 9,715 6.3
Native American / Other 156 4.1 2,728 1.8
Total 3,797 155,223
Notes: Race categories are adjusted for multi-ethnicity. Race reported are adjusted for multi-ethnicity. Missing race
information in the AJD has been updated with the LSAC race information when available. The counts of Black, Hispanic,
and Asian AJD respondents reported here are for the National Sample, intended to be representative of the national
population of new lawyers.
Sources: Data on gender are based on the ABA Survey of Law Schools, 1997 Cohort of first-year law students. Data on
race/ethnicity are based on 2000 Public-Use Micro 5% Samples weighted, all lawyers and judges, ages 27-32.
survey provides demographic information about respondent’s sex, race, age, marital status, and
region of current employment.
6.1 Descriptive Statistics of the AJD
In the first wave of the AJD, about 70% of the respondents work in private law, 20% in government,
and the rest in business, education, and other industries. Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics
of the respondents in the first AJD wave.
Men and women are fairly equally represented in the national sample. However, among those
working in a private firm, females make up over 56% of black lawyers. This pattern is in line
with the higher average education levels among women in the overall U.S. black population (Slater
1994). Lawyers in the sample are about 32 years old and about half of them are married. However,
blacks in private firms are significantly less likely to be married, reflecting differences in the overall
U.S. population (Lichter and McLaughlin 1992). About 65% of the Wave 1 respondents report
that their current position is their first job out of law school implying that a sizable fraction of
the sample has changed jobs in the first two years of their legal career. However, there are no
black-white differences in the first turnover for those working in private law firms.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of the AJD Sample - Wave 1
Sample: National Sample Private Firms Only
Race: All Whites Blacks Whites 6= Blacks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.463 0.414 0.568 ***
(0.499) (0.493) (0.497)
Age 31.783 31.011 30.966
(5.841) (4.935) (4.586)
Married 0.547 0.586 0.322 **
(0.498) (0.493) (0.469)
First Job 0.605 0.644 0.654
(0.489) (0.479) (0.477)
GPA Category 3.474 3.161 4.037 **
(1.432) (1.357) (1.445)
Law School Rank 3.252 3.164 2.811 **
(1.227) (1.189) (1.272)
General Law Review 0.215 0.266 0.154 **
(0.411) (0.442) (0.362)
Educational Debt ($) 59,964 62,395 75,448 **
(41,137) (41,571) (35,788)
Firm Size (lawyers) 231.453 239.409 355.825 **
(391.426) (373.692) (536.96)
Firm Size ≥ 250 lawyers 0.582 0.306 0.412 **
(0.493) (0.461) (0.493)
Major Region (NY, Chicago, LA, DC) 0.320 0.316 0.532 **
(0.467) (0.465) (0.5)
Salary ($) 83,874 95,082 106,276 **
(48,338) (47,657) (48,413)
Stay for 5+ years 0.360 0.402 0.186 ***
(0.480) (0.49) (0.39)
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. GPA categories: 1 = 3.75 to 4.0, 2 = 3.5 to 3.74, 3 = 3.25 to 3.49, 4
= 3.00 to 3.24, 5 = 2.75 to 2.99, 6 = 2.5 to 2.74, 7 = 2.25 to 2.49, 8 = less than 2.25; Law school tiers: 1 = Top 10, 2 = Top
11 to 20, 3 = top 21 to 100, 4 = Tier 4, 5 = Tier 5. Private firms only sample includes the minority over-sample. Race
categories are adjusted for multi-ethnicity. Missing race information in the AJD survey has been updated with the LSAC race
information when available. Number of observations varies across variables. For the national sample, observations range from
1,970 (GPA Category) to 4,541. For the private firm whites, from 966 to 1,959, and for the private firm blacks, from 80 to 190.
*= different from zero at the 10% level. **= different from zero at the 5% level. ***= different from zero at the 1% level.
Source: After the JD - Wave 1 (Restricted Release)
Let’s now turn to law school performance. Those lawyers working in private law firms tend
to have better law school GPAs and to have graduated from better ranked law schools than the
average lawyer in the national sample. However, blacks in private law firms have GPAs that are
0.25 to 0.5 points lower than whites on average.14 This translates into a difference of about a
fifth to a third of a standard deviation. On average, blacks in private firms come from higher
14For a more comprehensive look at the GPA distributions of black and whites lawyers in our sample, see Figure
A.2 in the Appendix.
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ranked law schools than whites, which may reflect the presence of affirmative action at law school
admissions. Being a part of the general law review is an honor set aside for top students with
excellent class work and highly-developed writing skills. About 20% of the national sample was
involved with the law school’s top scholarly journal. A greater proportion of whites in private firms
were on law review than in the national sample, while a smaller fraction of black lawyers were a
part of this organization. An average lawyer still carries about $60,000 of educational debt two
years into his/her career, and those working in private firms have more debt. Private-firm blacks
carry $10,000 more education debt than whites.
Two years into their legal career, blacks are working for significantly larger firms than whites,
and a greater proportion of them are working for the largest firms with more than 250 lawyers.
Firm size and prestige are highly correlated in the legal industry. Therefore, we can interpret
these differences in average firm size as cursory evidence that black lawyers might face lower hiring
standards than whites at the most selective law firms.
Table 4 also reports large differences in the geographical location of jobs between blacks and
whites, with over half of black lawyers working in a major legal market (NY, Chicago, LA, and
Washington D.C.) compared to only 32% of whites. This geographical difference is obviously
correlated with the size of the law firm, with bigger law firms more likely to have offices in these
four cities. As expected, lawyers in private firms have higher salaries than the national average, and
black lawyers make more than whites. This salary difference is reasonable given the finding that
black lawyers work in larger, more prestigious law firms with higher salaries for their associates.
Finally, in private firms, there is a dramatic difference in black and white lawyers’ intentions
to stay in their current position. 40% of white lawyers report an intention to stay for five or more
years compared to only 19% of blacks. While not reported here, when we restrict the private firm
sample to the largest firms with 250 lawyers or more, 29% of whites versus 12.3% of blacks plan to
stay in their current position for more than 5 years. Again, the difference is statistically significant
at the 1 percent-level. These disparities in tenure expectations may reflect the lawyers’ assessment
of their partnership chances as well as any black and white differences in career goals or preferences.
7 Empirical Analysis
Throughout most of this empirical section, I focus on comparing the careers of black and white
lawyers in large private law firms for three reasons. First, larger firms tend to be more prestigious,
offer higher salaries, and be more selective about their hires. Therefore, without affirmative action
at hiring, representation of blacks in these firms should be much lower than whites given the
blacks’ lower average GPAs and law review selections. Consequently, the effect of a diversity-
22
Job Assignment and Promotion Under Statistical Discrimination Jee-Yeon K. Lehmann
promoting hiring policy in raising the hiring rates of blacks should be most salient in these large
firms. Second, an employer is required to file an Employer Information Report EEO-1 to the
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission if it employs 100 or more employees. Therefore,
given that larger firms are more likely to be held accountable to equal representation of minorities
among its staff, these firms should be more inclined to make an effort to increase the fraction of
minority hires. Three, big law firms have a large number of partners, and the number of partners
represented in the central hiring committee is likely to be small compared to the overall pool of
partners in the firm. Therefore, in these large firms, there would be less overlap in the identity of
the decision-makers between hiring and task assignment stages.
I define a large law firm as a firm with 250 lawyers or more, just below the average size of 262
lawyers in our sample among those working in a private law firm. This definition is consistent with
the typical distinction between large- to medium-sized law firms found in literature.15
Throughout my empirical analysis, I compare the results from large firms with those from small
firms, where a small firm is defined as a firm with less than 50 lawyers. For the reasons stated
above, small firms may be less likely to use affirmative action at hiring. Moreover, even if these
firms used affirmative action at hiring, smaller firm size will imply that there is less of a distinction
in the diversity goals at hiring and at task assignment. If so, we would predict minimal black-white
differences in hiring, task assignment, and promotion conditional on being hired and/or observable
credentials in small firms.
Finally, I limit my discussion to career differences between blacks and whites, because black
lawyers enter the legal job market with the lowest GPAs and law review participation compared to
any other minority group. This implies that in the absence of a diversity program, they will face
the lowest hiring rates. In contrary, as my empirical results will show, controlling for observable
signals of qualifications, only blacks – not any other minority group – are more likely to be working
in the nation’s most prestigious firms. I interpret this finding as evidence that affirmative action
at hiring is targeting black applicants more intensely than any other minority group. Firms may
focus their diversity efforts on blacks, because the proportion of blacks within an organization may
be the most salient indicator of staff diversity rather than Hispanics or Asians.
7.1 Prediction 1: Black-White Differences in Hiring
If large firms use affirmative action at hiring, conditional on observables correlated with the ap-
plicants’ qualifications, blacks should be more likely to be hired than whites. Figure 4 shows the
distribution of the firm sizes of current employment for each GPA category. In the first graph, over
15Altering this definition slightly does not change the main results.
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70% all blacks in the highest GPA category compared to less than half of the highest achieving
whites are working in the largest law firms. For each GPA category above 3.0, blacks are more
likely to be working in the largest firm than whites. Below a GPA of 3.0, there is minimal difference
in firm sizes with most respondents working in the smallest firm category.
However, the higher likelihood of blacks to be working in larger firms could be driven by the
fact that a greater proportion of blacks are working in the four major cities. Therefore, we want to
test whether black-white differences in hiring standards remain after controlling demographic and
regional differences.
Our empirical strategy is as follows. For each individual i, let
yi =
{
1 if firm size ≥ 250 lawyers
0 if firm size < 250 lawyers.
I estimate the following probit model using maximum likelihood estimation:
Pr[yi = 1|X,S,R] = Φ
(
β0 + β1X + β2S + β3R
)
(13)
where Φ(·) is the standard normal CDF, X is a set of demographic controls, S is a set of law school
performance variables, and R is set of regional dummies. Alternative specifications using OLS or
logit models do not change the sign or the significance of the coefficients of interest.
Table 5 reports the probit results. Column (1) only controls for basic demographic variables
and whether the current job is his/her first job out of law school. The coefficient on Black is
positive but statistically insignificant, while being Asian and younger is associated with a greater
likelihood of working in a large firm. Lawyers are more likely to be working in a large firm fresh
out of law school. Controlling for school performance in column (2) takes away the significance all
the demographic controls, but the position being the first job remains positive and significant.16
Furthermore, now being black is associated with an increase in the probability of working in a large
firm.
With the highest GPA and law school tiers serving as the omitted categories, the signs of co-
efficients on the GPA categories and law school tiers are negative as expected, except for the next
highest GPA category of 3.5 to 3.74. While each tier drop in law school implies a decreased proba-
bility of working for a large private firm, GPAs above 3.5 seem to share fairly similar probabilities.
Below a GPA of 3.25, each drop in category is associated with a greater decrease in the likelihood
16In alternative specifications, I include log of education debt as a part of the standard set of controls. The
coefficient is small and positive for all specifications, and it does not change the magnitude or significance of the
Black coefficients. I lose about 400 observations by controlling for educational debt, so I have decided not to include
it in the results presented here.
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Figure 4: Distribution of Firm Sizes Across GPA Categories
Notes: All graphs include the minority over-sample. Race categories are adjusted for multi-ethnicity. Missing race
information in the AJD survey have been updated with the LSAC race information when available. The sample is
restricted to those respondents whose current position is in a private law firm.
Source: After the JD - Wave 1 (Restricted Release)
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Table 5: Probability of Working in A Large Private Law Firm (Probit Results)
Dependent Variable=1 if Current Firm Size ≥ 250 lawyers
(1) (2) (3)
Black 0.116 0.203* 0.067
(0.111) (0.110) (0.121)
Hispanic -0.057 0.040 -0.095
(0.135) (0.155) (0.141)
Asian 0.353** 0.153 -0.014
(0.153) (0.144) (0.131)
Female 0.043 0.064 0.039
(0.073) (0.068) (0.059)
Age -0.025*** -0.004 -0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Married -0.027 -0.008 0.080
(0.063) (0.078) (0.082)
First Job 0.397*** 0.322*** 0.360***
(0.055) (0.067) (0.070)
GPA = 3.5 to 3.74 0.178 0.109
(0.148) (0.133)
GPA = 3.25 to 3.49 -0.189 -0.324*
(0.221) (0.186)
GPA = 3.00 to 3.24 -0.506** -0.578***
(0.218) (0.221)
GPA = 2.75 to 2.99 -0.913*** -0.940***
(0.234) (0.254)
GPA = 2.50 to 2.74 -0.600* -0.539
(0.334) (0.343)
LS Rank 11 to 25 -0.498*** -0.328**
(0.184) (0.127)
LS Rank 26 to 100 -1.170*** -0.898***
(0.129) (0.131)
LS Rank > 100 -1.623*** -1.389***
(0.208) (0.181)
Law Review 0.495*** 0.562***
(0.077) (0.074)
Additional Controls:
Regional dummies ×
Notes: Excluded Categories: Male, White, GPA=3.75 to 4.0, Law School Rank 1 to 10. The sample is restricted to those
working in a private law firms. A “large private law firm” is defined as a firm with 250 or more lawyers. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses and clustered at the regional level. All estimates are weighted using sample probability weights
adjusted for non-response. Race categories are adjusted for multi-ethnicity. Missing race information in the AJD survey has
been updated with the LSAC race information when available. * = different from zero at the 10% level. ** = different from
zero at the 5% level. *** = different from zero at the 1% level.
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of working for a large firm. Being a part of the law review is associated with a large increase in the
probability of working for a large law firm.
As anticipated, adding regional controls in column (3) drastically lowers the coefficient on
Black and renders it statistically insignificant. The addition of regional controls generally increases
the magnitudes of the coefficients on GPA category and decreases it for the law school rankings,
although it has no impact on the statistical significance of these coefficients except for the GPA
category of 3.25 to 3.49. However, it is important to recognize that the geographic location of
one’s work is not exogenous to the type of jobs that one is able to attain. Some blacks may be
working in one of the major cities because they were hired at a large firm while some whites may be
forced to locate to a small city because they were only able to find a position in a small, local firm.
Consequently, including regional controls would likely underestimate the impact of being black on
the likelihood of working at a large law firm.
Thus far, the coefficients on Black have been positive but not different from zero at conventional
levels. However, as can be gleaned from Figure 4, being in the higher GPA categories seems to have
drastically disparate impact on the likelihood of working for a large firm between blacks and whites
while this difference seems minimal in the lower GPA categories. Furthermore, the law school GPA
distributions of blacks and whites are very different with a very few blacks in the highest GPA
categories compared to whites.17 Finally, only those lawyers with a GPA greater than 3.0 seem to
have a reasonable chance at working in a large law firm. These three observations suggest that we
should be allowing law school performance to impact blacks and whites differently and to focus on
black-white differences in lawyers with the highest observable qualifications.
Accordingly, Table 6 reports probit estimates from models controlling for race interactions with
GPA and law school rankings. The positive coefficient on Black is large and statistically significant
at the 1% level, implying that being the best qualified (in terms of observables) blacks is associated
with a much higher probability of working at a larger firm compared to the most qualified whites.
We see an opposite effect for being the best qualified Hispanics and no significant effect for Asians.
However, the addition of these interactions between race and law school performance categories
does change the magnitude or the significance of other coefficients.
Dropping down one level from the highest GPA still implies a negative effect for blacks, but
when combined with the coefficient on Black, the sum is still positive. This implies that compared
to whites with a GPA between 3.75 and 4.0, blacks with a GPA 0.25 points below them are still more
likely to be working for a large law firm. However the positive effect of being black disappears by the
next GPA category down (3.25 to 3.49). Examining the coefficients on law school interactions, we
can see that compared to the best whites, dropping down a law school tier negative but statistically
17Figure A.2 in the appendix shows GPA distribution by organization for blacks and whites in the AJD.
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Table 6: Probability of Working in A Large Private Law Firm
(Probit Results With Race Interactions)
Dependent Variable=1 if Current Firm Size ≥ 250 lawyers
(1) (2) (3)
Black 6.446*** 6.268*** 7.045***
(0.706) (0.338) (0.808)
Hispanic -0.659* -0.880** -1.085**
(0.370) (0.415) (0.497)
Asian -1.072 -0.818 -0.751
(0.955) (0.908) (1.030)
Female 0.063 0.045 0.039
(0.066) (0.060) (0.059)
Age -0.003 -0.004 -0.005
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Married -0.012 0.074 0.065
(0.075) (0.081) (0.078)
First Job 0.319*** 0.357*** 0.358***
(0.068) (0.071) (0.076)
GPA = 3.50 to 3.74 -0.005 -0.037 -0.039
(0.139) (0.140) (0.137)
GPA = 3.25 to 3.49 -0.267 -0.353* -0.358*
(0.221) (0.206) (0.200)
GPA = 3.00 to 3.24 -0.714*** -0.762*** -0.771***
(0.249) (0.269) (0.260)
GPA = 2.75 to 2.99 -0.955*** -0.926*** -0.941***
(0.255) (0.290) (0.281)
Black × GPA = 3.50 to 3.74 -5.532*** -5.659*** -5.644***
(0.719) (0.499) (0.804)
Black × GPA = 3.25 to 3.49 -6.268*** -6.519*** -6.572***
(0.733) (0.243) (0.754)
Black × GPA = 3.00 to 3.24 -5.660*** -5.744*** -5.802***
(0.812) (0.441) (0.870)
Black × GPA = 2.75 to 2.99 -6.360*** -6.336*** -6.360***
(0.879) (0.870) (0.863)
LS Rank 11 to 25 -0.514*** -0.339*** -0.284*
(0.185) (0.126) (0.148)
LS Rank 26 to 100 -1.180*** -0.905*** -0.786***
(0.135) (0.130) (0.120)
LS Rank > 100 -1.649*** -1.428*** -1.354***
(0.204) (0.177) (0.157)
Black × LS Rank 11 to 25 -0.334
(0.372)
Black × LS Rank 26 to 100 -1.254***
(0.273)
Black × LS Rank > 100 -0.764**
(0.359)
Law Review 0.506*** 0.575*** 0.571***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.074)
Additional Controls:
Race × GPA × × ×
Regional dummies × ×
Race × LS Rank ×
Notes: Excluded Categories: Male, White, GPA=3.75 to 4.0, Law School Rank 1 to 10. The sample is restricted to those
working in a private law firms. The sample is restricted to those working in private law firms. A “large private law firm” is
defined as a firm with 250 or more lawyers. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the regional level.
All estimates are weighted using sample probability weights adjusted for non-response. Race categories are adjusted for
multi-ethnicity. Missing race information in the AJD survey has been updated with the LSAC race information when available.
* = different from zero at the 10% level. ** = different from zero at the 5% level. *** = different from zero at the 1% level.
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insignificant effect on the probability of working in a large firm. Overall, GPA seems to have a
greater impact on a black lawyer’s likelihood of working in a large firm than law school rankings.
The firms may consider law school performance as defined by GPA as a better predictor of the
applicant’s qualifications than the rank of his/her law school. Furthermore, considering that law
schools themselves may be using affirmative action in admitting blacks, school rankings may be a
noisier signal of qualification for blacks.
From Table 6 alone, it is difficult to compare the predicted probabilities of similarly qualified
blacks and whites. For a more precise comparison, Table 7 reports black and white differences in
the predicted probabilities of working in a large firm across different GPA-law school categories.
The predictions are based on the estimates from the last specification in Table 6 for a 31 year old,
non-law review male working in his first job in New York City. The percentage of black lawyers
working in private law who fall into each GPA-law school rank cell are reported in brackets.
In Table 7, several patterns are striking. First, conditional on having the highest GPA, black
lawyers are much more likely to be working in a large firm no matter what his law school ranking is.
However, in our data, only very few blacks have the highest GPA category. The same pattern holds
true for the next highest GPA category, although the positive effect of being black is insignificant
for the law school ranking between 21 and 100. Second, conditional on graduating from a top
20 law school, blacks are more likely to be working in a large firm by 9 to 27 percentage points
than similarly qualified whites. The black-white differences in two lowest GPA categories are still
positive, although they are not statistically different from zero.
In summary, Table 7 tells the following story about hiring at the nation’s most prestigious law
firms. Large firms are much more likely to hire a high-performing black graduate no matter what
law school he has attended. Similarly, they are much more willing to hire a black graduate from a
top 20 law school despite his/her moderate GPAs, but they are considerably more selective about
whites graduating from the same top schools.
To further substantiate the story that large private firms are using affirmative action at hiring,
I examine whether blacks are also more likely to be hired in small firms compared to whites
with similar observable credentials. I argued before that small firms should be less likely to be
making an effort to diversify their workforce, because they are not required to file an EEO-1
report. Furthermore, their low profile might imply that they are not as publicly scrutinized about
the lack of minorities within the firm. Table A.1 in the Appendix reports the black and white
differences in predicted probabilities of working in a small firm. Aside from those GPA/law school
categories from which workers are heavily hired by large firms, there are no significant differences
in the hiring probabilities of blacks and whites in small firms.
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Table 7: Predicted Probability of Working in A Large Firm
by GPA and LS Rank: Black minus White
Law School Ranking
1 to 10 11 to 20 21 to 100 101 to 137 138 to 178
GPA=3.75 to 4.00 0.092*** 0.148*** 0.294*** 0.092*** 0.642***
(0.035) (0.042) (0.054) (0.035) (0.105)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [1.23] [0.00]
GPA=3.50 to 3.74 0.095*** 0.138*** 0.050 0.071** 0.311***
(0.028) (0.040) (0.153) (0.030) (0.114)
[1.23] [2.47] [3.7] [2.47] [2.47]
GPA=3.25 to 3.49 0.091** 0.042 -0.298*** -0.082 -0.037
(0.042) (0.077) (0.093) (0.106) (0.104)
[7.41] [4.94] [8.64] [2.47] [1.23]
GPA=3.00 to 3.24 0.252*** 0.273*** -0.004 0.138 0.183
(0.071) (0.103) (0.183) (0.114) (0.139)
[7.41] [6.17] [11.11] [1.23] [0.00]
GPA=2.75 to 2.99 0.207 0.134 -0.179 -0.030 0.015
(0.127) (0.217) (0.115) (0.119) (0.066)
[1.23] [2.47] [6.17] [2.47] [2.47]
GPA=2.50 to 2.74 0.181 0.214 -0.017 0.102 0.208
(0.118) (0.145) (0.339) (0.156) (0.303)
[1.23] [0.00] [4.94] [1.23] [1.23]
Notes: Race categories are adjusted for multi-ethnicity. Missing race information in the AJD survey has been updated with
the LSAC race information when available. Predicted probabilities are based on probit estimates in Table 6, column (3).
Standard errors reported in parentheses have been calculated using the Delta method. Predicted probabilities are for male, 31
years old, married, first job, no law review, New York. Reported in brackets is the proportion of black lawyers working in
private law firms belonging to each GPA-law school rank cell. * = different from zero at the 10% level. ** = different from
zero at the 5% level. *** = different from zero at the 1% level.
7.2 Prediction 2 and 3: Black and White Differences in Track Assignments
Lower hiring standards for blacks increases the fraction of unqualified workers among the black hires
relative to whites. Therefore, conditional on being hired, blacks will be assigned to worse tasks
(and/or receive worse mentoring) than whites on average. This result naturally arises from a simple
model of affirmative action. However, as we have seen in our model of statistical discrimination,
affirmative action stigmatizes all black hires, and seniors choose to set a higher promotion track
standard for blacks than for whites. Therefore, even conditional on observable credentials, blacks
should be less likely to be assigned to better tasks (or receive better mentoring).
We first examine black and white differences in tasks and followed by differences in associate
interactions with partners.
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7.2.1 Tasks
The AJD asks the following question about the type of tasks that the respondent performs regularly
in his/her current position: “Over the life of these matters, on how many of them were you (insert
task)?” Table 8 reports the mean proportion of respondents answering “Most” or “All” to this
question in private law firms by race.
In my conversations with associates from large corporate law firms, I tried to get a sense of the
general desirability and value of these tasks. For most tasks, there was no clear consensus with
lawyers citing that the type of law you practice and the specific case in which you are involved will
determine the type of tasks you perform. Moreover, while spending 100 or more hours in document
review may not be the most thrilling work, junior associates, as a group, are often relegated to
this undesirable but necessary task. As such, large differences in task assignments might not exist
among low ranked associates. Yet a few tasks did stand out as more attractive and rewarding or as
responsibilities that might be given to the most promising associates: appearing in courts as a first
or second chair, formulating strategies with seniors and/clients, traveling to meet clients/interview
witnesses/or make a court appearance, and assigning and/or supervising attorneys or paralegals.
In Table 8, we can see that blacks are less likely to be spending most of their time in three
of the four “desirable” tasks with the exception being traveling. The rest of the “neutral” tasks
exhibit no differences between blacks and whites. As a whole, Table 8 provides some evidence for
the second prediction that among those hired in firms using affirmative action, a smaller fraction
of blacks are assigned to better tasks.
However, these differences in means could be explained by systematic differences in basic demo-
graphic characteristics and region of employment between black and white lawyers. Furthermore,
we want to examine whether there are black-white differences in task assignments even conditional
on observable correlates of qualification. To that end, Table 9 presents OLS results from the
following regression estimating the likelihood of being assigned to the four desirable tasks:18
yi = β0 + β1X + β2S + β3R+ εi (14)
where
yi =
{
1 if “Most” or “All”
0 otherwise.
Column (1) controls for basic demographic variable and the respondent’s region of employment.
Conditional on being hired into a large firm, there are no statistically significant black-white differ-
18I report OLS results for ease of interpretation. Alternative specifications using probit and logit models do not
change the results.
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Table 8: Tasks by Firm Size and Race: Proportion Answering “Most” or “All”
Firm Sample: All Private Firms Large Private Firms
Race: All White Black W 6=B
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Appearing in court as 1st or 2nd chair 0.130 0.025 0.000 **
(0.337) (0.158) (0.000)
2. Formulating strategy with seniors and/or clients 0.339 0.348 0.135 ***
(0.474) (0.477) (0.347)
3. Traveling to meet clients, interview witness, or court appearance 0.210 0.111 0.111
(0.407) (0.315) (0.319)
4. Assigning and/or supervising attorneys or paralegals 0.114 0.088 0.029 *
(0.318) (0.284) (0.169)
5. Responsible for keeping client updated 0.360 0.284 0.270
(0.480) (0.452) (0.450)
6. Work limited to routine research and memo 0.093 0.108 0.056
(0.290) (0.311) (0.232)
7. Spending 100+ hours reviewing discovered documents 0.052 0.028 0.027
(0.222) (0.166) (0.164)
8. Writing motions or taking depositions 0.219 0.132 0.125
(0.414) (0.339) (0.336)
9. Drafting transactional documents 0.19 0.281 0.214
(0.392) (0.450) (0.418)
10. Handling entire matter on your own 0.124 0.038 0.027
(0.33) (0.193) (0.164)
Notes: The exact wording of the question is “Over the total life of these matters, on how many of them were
you....” The response choices are: NA, None, Some, Half, Most, or All. The sample is restricted to those working in
a private law firm. A large private law firm is defined as a firm with 250 or more lawyers. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. Race categories are adjusted for multi-ethnicity. Missing race information in the AJD
survey has been updated with the LSAC race information when available. * = different from zero at the 10% level.
** = different from zero at the 5% level. *** = different from zero at the 1% level.
ences in the likelihood of appearing in courts or traveling to meet clients, the coefficient on black is
still negative. However, being black is associated with a large significant decrease in the likelihood
of formulating strategies with seniors/clients and assigning/supervising the workers of others in the
firm. Overall, there is support for worse task assignments for blacks conditional on being hired
reflecting the lower average qualifications of hired blacks due to affirmative action.
However, if partners do not statistically discriminate against the hired blacks, then conditional
on their observable skill signals, blacks and white hires should have similar task assignments. But
if affirmative action negatively stigmatizes all black hires as in our model, then black hires should
be assigned to worse tasks than whites, even conditional on their observable credentials. To test
this prediction, I add in law school performance controls (law school GPA, law school tier, and law
review participation) in columns (2) and (3) of Table 9. Even conditional on skill signals, blacks
are much less likely to be formulating strategy with seniors and supervising others as predicted by
our model of statistical discrimination.
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Table 9: Desirable Task Assignment in Large Private Firms (OLS Results)
Dependent Variable=1 if “most” or “all”
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Appearing in court as 1st or 2nd chair
Black -0.006 -0.025 -0.017 -0.018
(0.009) (0.018) (0.019) (0.067)
Hispanic -0.009 -0.016* -0.016 0.017
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.064)
Asian -0.015 -0.012* -0.021** -0.027
(0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.036)
Female -0.012 -0.019 -0.016 -0.036
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.032)
Panel B: Formulating strategy with seniors and/or clients
Black -0.256*** -0.271*** -0.253*** -0.092
(0.078) (0.078) (0.084) (0.164)
Hispanic -0.186* -0.172 -0.161 -0.084
(0.098) (0.100) (0.098) (0.190)
Asian -0.179** -0.189** -0.178** 0.121
(0.069) (0.075) (0.066) (0.177)
Female 0.093 0.127** 0.130** 0.148*
(0.057) (0.044) (0.045) (0.080)
Panel C: Traveling to meet clients, witnesses, appear in court
Black -0.025 -0.051 -0.041 -0.130
(0.039) (0.042) (0.041) (0.156)
Hispanic -0.087*** -0.074* -0.059 -0.034
(0.021) (0.040) (0.046) (0.199)
Asian -0.045 -0.050 -0.053 0.177
(0.054) (0.060) (0.058) (0.149)
Female 0.035 0.051 0.048 0.221***
(0.037) (0.032) (0.039) (0.063)
Panel D: Assigning and/or supervising attorneys or paralegals
Black -0.072*** -0.070*** -0.087*** -0.009
(0.021) (0.017) (0.020) (0.066)
Hispanic 0.045 0.020 0.040 -0.053
(0.062) (0.065) (0.075) (0.265)
Asian 0.063 0.063 0.083 0.192
(0.090) (0.101) (0.101) (0.122)
Female 0.058** 0.035 0.042 0.106***
(0.027) (0.023) (0.026) (0.035)
N 392.000 358.000 358.000 110.000
Other Controls:
School Rank/Performance × × ×
Regional dummies × × ×
Area of Law ×
Notes: The exact survey question is “Over the total life of these matters, on how many of them were you....?” The sample is
restricted to those working in a large private law firm. Standard errors are clustered at the regional level. Standard controls
include dummies indicating female, Black, Hispanic, Asian, Native/Other, age, current marital status, and whether the current
job is their first job out of law school. All estimates are weighted using sample probability weights adjusted for non-response.
Race categories are adjusted for multi-ethnicity. Missing race information in the AJD survey has been updated with the LSAC
race information when available. The sample sizes reported are for assigning and/or supervising attorneys or paralegals. * =
different from zero at the 10% level. ** = different from zero at the 5% level. *** = different from zero at the 1% level.
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Column (4) additionally controls for the proportion time spent in each area of the law, and the
effect of being black across all four tasks becomes statistically insignificant although still negative.19
However, this question is left unanswered for most of the respondents, and we lose about two-thirds
of the observations from the first three regressions. Furthermore, the area of law is probably en-
dogenous to the associates’ task or track assignment. Placement into a particular practice group is
often determined by those within the firm and may itself reflect the firm’s assessment of the asso-
ciate’s qualifications. Therefore, controlling for the area of law will likely lead to a downward bias
on the impact of being black on assignment to worse tasks, conditional on observable credentials.
As argued before, smaller firms are less likely to be scrutinized for diversity, because they do
not have file an EEO-1 report. Therefore, they should be less likely to be using affirmative action
at hiring. If blacks and whites face similar hiring standards, then there should be no black-white
differences in task assignments conditional on being hired and conditional on observable skill signals.
We analyze whether this is the case. Table A.2 in the appendix examines black-white differences in
formulating strategies with seniors/clients and supervising attorneys/paralegals in firms with less
than 50 lawyers. Compared to large firms, the coefficients on Black are smaller (and in some cases
positive) for both tasks and statistically insignificant across all specifications in a small firm. This
absence of black-white quality differences in task assignments in the small firm bolsters the claim
that these differences in large firms are not simply the result of racism but one driven by differences
in hiring standards and in the perceived quality of the hired.
7.2.2 Firm Activities and Interactions with Partners
We can also interpret the promotion track assignment as a partner’s decision to personally invest in
the associate or mentor him/her. The AJD also asks about firm activities in which the respondents
participate on a recurring basis, and Table 10 presents the mean responses for those in the private
firm. Blacks working in large firms are much less likely to be joining partners or senior attorneys for
lunch or spending recreational time with them. However, there is no statistically significant black-
white difference in the social time spent with other associates. In contrast, we see no black-white
differences in interactions with partners in firms with less than 50 lawyers.
An important point to note in Table 10 is that there are no clear black-white disparities in
writing for publications/seminars or participating in bar or civic associations. In the institutional
background, I mentioned that these two activities may be important for future business development
and can reflect the effort the associate is making towards partnership. While we cannot control for
quality, the absence of a large difference in the participation in these two activities provides some
19Lawyers in large private firms spend most of their time in civil litigation (20%), general corporate (14%), intel-
lectual property (11%) and securities (10%).
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evidence against the idea that worse partnership rates of blacks are merely reflective of the black
associates’ lower desire for partnership.
Similar to our analysis of task assignments, we want to know whether these black-white differ-
ences remain after controlling for basic demographic and regional controls, and most importantly,
conditional on observable signals of qualifications. For small and large firms, Table 11 compares
the likelihood of close interactions with partners controlling for standard demographic variables,
GPA and law school rank, and regional dummies. In large firms, being black is associated with a
large decrease in the probability that an associate spends recreational time with partners or senior
attorneys conditional on being hired (column (1)) and even conditional on observable qualifications
(columns (2) and (3)). The effect is negative and of similar magnitude for joining partners or se-
niors for lunch but is not statistically significant. In small firms, however, there are no black-white
differences in partnership interactions conditional on being hired and observable qualifications. In-
terestingly, it is women, rather than blacks, who seem to interact less with partners in these small
firms.
Table 10: Firm Activities: Mean Proportion Answering “Yes”
Firm Sample: Large Private Firms Small Private Firms
Race: White Black W 6= B White Black W 6= B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Participate in firm recruiting 0.326 0.371 0.167 0.172
(0.029) (0.083) (0.018) (0.071)
Join partners/seniors for lunch 0.54 0.314 ** 0.669 0.655
(0.031) (0.080) (0.023) (0.090)
Spend recreational time with partners/seniors 0.226 0.057 *** 0.400 0.345
(0.026) (0.057) (0.023) (0.090)
Spend recreational time with associates 0.785 0.886 0.495 0.483
(0.026) (0.055) (0.024) (0.094)
Write for publications, presentations, seminars 0.222 0.143 0.201 0.138
(0.026) (0.060) (0.019) (0.065)
Monthly participation in bar/civic/non-profit assoc. 0.264 0.314 0.495 0.655 *
(0.027) (0.080) (0.024) (0.090)
Notes: The exact wording of the question is “Which of the following do you do on a recurring basis? Check all
that apply.” Standard errors are reported in parentheses. A “large private firm” is defined as a firm with 250 or
more lawyers. A “small private firm” is defined as a firm with less than 50 lawyers. Race categories are adjusted for
multi-ethnicity. Missing race information in the AJD survey has been updated with the LSAC race information
when available. * = different from zero at the 10% level. ** = different from zero at the 5% level. *** = different
from zero at the 1% level.
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Table 11: Interaction with Partners by Firm Size
Dependent Variable=1 if “Yes”
Panel A: Join partners/seniors for lunch
Large Law Firm Small Law Firm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Black -0.155 -0.134 -0.147 0.016 0.050 0.048
(0.102) (0.109) (0.111) (0.092) (0.085) (0.086)
Hispanic -0.105 -0.046 -0.065 0.117 0.138 0.138
(0.158) (0.136) (0.14) (0.093) (0.102) (0.123)
Asian -0.127 -0.041 -0.048 -0.097 -0.108 -0.110
(0.077) (0.082) (0.075) (0.072) (0.081) (0.092)
Female -0.031 0.012 0.018 -0.118** -0.131** -0.121**
(0.066) (0.058) (0.064) (0.045) (0.055) (0.051)
Panel B: Spend recreational time with partners/seniors
Large Law Firm Small Law Firm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Black -0.175*** -0.194*** -0.164*** 0.032 0.042 0.050
(0.027) (0.043) (0.038) (0.157) (0.146) (0.148)
Hispanic -0.163** -0.131 -0.158 0.098 0.093 0.093
(0.06) (0.084) (0.107) (0.096) (0.108) (0.111)
Asian -0.044 -0.037 -0.102 0.034 0.052 0.076
(0.072) (0.09) (0.093) (0.080) (0.090) (0.095)
Female -0.051 -0.006 -0.013 -0.039 -0.023 -0.022
(0.057) (0.054) (0.056) (0.048) (0.047) (0.044)
Other Controls:
School Rank/Performance × × × ×
Regional controls × ×
Note: The exact wording of the question is “Which of the following do you do on a recurring basis? Check all that apply.”
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the regional level. A “large law firm” is defined as a private law
firm with 250 or more lawyers. A “small law firm” is defined as a private law firm with less than 50 lawyers. Race categories
are adjusted for multi-ethnicity. Missing race information in the AJD survey has been updated with the LSAC race
information when available. * = different from zero at the 10% level. ** = different from zero at the 5% level. *** = different
from zero at the 1% level.
7.2.3 Satisfaction
These disparities in task assignments and partner interactions probably contribute to wide black
and white differences in the mean level of satisfaction in large private firms as shown in Table 12.
It is striking how blacks in large firms consistently report lower levels of satisfaction than whites,
while no significant differences exist among those working in small firms.20 The first four attributes
relate specifically to the quality of tasks and responsibilities, and blacks in large firms report a
level of satisfaction that is about 0.5 points or a third of a standard deviation below that of whites.
20Estimates using ordered probit show similar results.
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Table 12: Black and White Differences in the Mean Level of Satisfaction by Firm Size
On a scale of 1 to 7 where 1 is highly dissatisfied and 7 is highly satisfied
Firm Sample: Large Private Firms Small Private Firms
Race: White Black W 6=B White Black W 6=B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Level of responsibility you have 5.337 4.712 *** 5.632 5.667
(0.064) (0.203) (0.054) (0.181)
Recognition you receive for your work 4.847 4.348 *** 4.918 4.952
(0.066) (0.184) (0.063) (0.248)
Substantive area of your work 5.277 4.712 ** 5.241 5.175
(0.064) (0.207) (0.06) (0.202)
Tasks you perform 4.882 4.364 *** 5.154 5.190
(0.058) (0.16) (0.052) (0.194)
Performance evaluation process 3.955 3.197 *** 3.889 4.000
(0.067) (0.177) (0.063) (0.226)
Opportunities for advancement 4.760 4.000 *** 4.817 4.841
(0.064) (0.188) (0.066) (0.24)
Job security 4.872 4.136 *** 5.425 5.254
(0.07) (0.204) (0.056) (0.209)
Minimum N 566 69 843 70
Maximum N 587 76 935 79
Notes: The exact survey question is “How satisfied are you with each of the following aspects of your current position?”
Possible rating is on a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 is highly dissatisfied and 7 is highly satisfied. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. A “large private firm” is defined as a firm with 250 or more lawyers. A “small private firm” is defined as a firm
with less than 50 lawyers. Race categories are adjusted for multi-ethnicity. Missing race information in the AJD survey has
been updated with the LSAC race information when available. * = different from zero at the 10% level. ** = different from
zero at the 5% level. *** = different from zero at the 1% level.
Admittedly, these are not huge differences, yet they are consistent across all five attributes and
highly significant. Blacks in large firms are also less satisfied with the performance evaluation
process and report worse sense of job security.
Of course, these measures are subjective. Although we cannot entirely dismiss the possibility
that blacks simply have higher expectations or are more pessimistic with regard to their work, the
absence of black and white differences in the small firms suggest that these differences in mean
satisfaction are reflective of real dissimilarities in the nature of task assignments and opportunities
for advancement in large firms.
7.3 Black and White Differences in Promotion at Large Law Firms
In this section, I examine whether black and white differences in hiring standards and assignment
into desirable tasks or interactions with partners can explain lower partnership rates of black lawyers
in large private firms. First, the model predicts that if blacks face a lower hiring standard, yet a
higher standard for the promotion track, then conditional on being hired into the large firm, black
workers should have lower promotion rates (Prediction 2). Furthermore, affirmative action leads
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to be statistical discrimination against blacks, blacks should be less likely to be promoted even
conditional on observable credentials (Prediction 3). However, conditional on task assignment,
black and whites differences in promotion rates should be reduced, eliminated, or even reversed
(Prediction 4).
7.3.1 Sample Attrition from Wave 1 to Wave 2
Wave 2 of the AJD conducted in late 2007 provides a detailed look at legal careers seven years after
the bar. Regrettably, there is considerable attrition in the sample from wave 1 to wave 2 with only
64% of the 4,538 respondents in Wave 1 replying to Wave 2. Furthermore, just over half of the
stayers in the sample reported their position in both waves. Table 13 examines whether there are
any systematic disparities between those who left and those who stayed in the sample between the
two survey waves. Panel A compares leavers and stayers in the sample, while Panel B compares
those who reported their position only in the first wave with those who reported their position in
both waves.
In Panel A, Blacks make up a small proportion of stayers than those who did not respond to
the second wave. However, while not reported here, when we restrict the sample to those who were
working in a private law firm in wave 1, the difference disappears. In Table 13, we can also see
stayers are younger, and more likely to have been working in his/her first job out of law school,
major region, or government and less likely to been in business at the time of the first survey.
Stayers also graduated from a higher ranked law school and reported slightly lower salaries in the
first wave.
Examining Panel B, we can see that respondents who reported their position only in wave 1
are not drastically different from those who reported their position in both waves. Those reporting
their current position in both waves are slightly younger, more likely to have been in their first job
and working in a major region in Wave 1, graduated from higher ranked school, and more likely to
have been in law review. But the magnitudes of these differences are minor.
For the sample attrition to bias our analysis about promotion, they need to impact a black
lawyer’s partnership chances differently than for a white attorney, and there is no clear reason to
suspect that this would be the case.
7.3.2 Transitions Between Wave 1 and Wave 2
Table 14 reports transitions between Wave 1 and Wave 2 positions for black and white lawyers.
Among whites who started as associates in Wave 1, about 6% start a solo practice and a little
less than half of them remain as associates. The corresponding fractions for black associates are
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Table 13: Descriptive Statistics of Stayers v. Leavers and Single v. Dual Positions Reported
PANEL A: Attritors Stayers
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N
black** 0.103 0.304 1649 0.083 0.276 2889
hispanic 0.086 0.281 1649 0.078 0.269 2889
asian 0.099 0.299 1649 0.085 0.28 2889
age* 31.851 5.754 1500 31.53 5.658 2799
married 0.51 0.5 1513 0.524 0.5 2801
first job*** 0.568 0.496 1561 0.617 0.486 2855
GPA 3.62 1.45 597 3.533 1.428 1656
LS Tier*** 3.323 1.304 1506 3.157 1.202 2821
General Law Review 0.192 0.394 1481 0.209 0.407 2728
No. of Lawyers in Firm 261.608 472.49 1097 234.73 380.302 1970
Major Region** (NY, Chicago, LA, DC) 0.385 0.487 1648 0.348 0.476 2889
Debt 62125.681 42760.24 1432 61796.844 40935.384 2729
Private Law 0.703 0.457 1512 0.683 0.465 2764
Government Law*** 0.196 0.397 1512 0.233 0.423 2764
Business/Other Law* 0.101 0.301 1512 0.084 0.277 2764
Salary** 87420.174 52027.759 1326 83879.153 46483.211 2567
PANEL B: Only Wave 1 Position Reported Wave 1 and 2 Positions Reported
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N
black 0.087 0.283 629 0.078 0.268 1531
hispanic 0.095 0.294 629 0.078 0.268 1531
asian 0.097 0.296 629 0.082 0.274 1531
age** 32.141 6.458 612 31.496 5.627 1509
married 0.524 0.5 620 0.53 0.499 1504
first job*** 0.611 0.488 628 0.677 0.468 1531
GPA 3.554 1.478 540 3.459 1.394 1350
LS Tier** 3.298 1.323 614 3.155 1.186 1518
General Law Review* 0.177 0.382 581 0.211 0.408 1439
No. of Lawyers in Firm 243.112 455.115 445 221.576 371.997 1106
Major Region (NY, Chicago, LA, DC)* 0.384 0.487 628 0.344 0.475 1531
Debt 59936.173 42845.273 584 62890.355 40589.351 1477
Private Law 0.712 0.453 625 0.713 0.452 1530
Government Law 0.229 0.42 625 0.238 0.426 1530
Business/Other Law 0.059 0.236 625 0.049 0.216 1530
Salary 84379.929 49489.959 580 81790.384 48529.579 1456
Notes: Includes both the national and the minority oversample. GPA categories: (1=3.5 to 4.0)(2=3.0 to 3.5)(3=2.5 to
3.0)(4=less than 2.5); LS tier: (1 = Top 10) (2 = Top 11 to 20) (3 = top 21 to 100) (4 = Tier 4) (5 = Tier 5). Race categories
are adjusted for multi-ethnicity. Missing race information in the AJD survey has been updated with the LSAC race
information when available. * = different from zero at the 10% level. ** = different from zero at the 5% level. *** = different
from zero at the 1% level.
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Table 14: Distribution of Wave 2 Positions of Wave 1: Black and White Associates
White Black
1 Solo 5.99 6.90
2 Associate 44.96 44.83
3 Partner 17.03 6.90
4 Contract/Staff Attorney 13.08 22.41
5 Clerk/Judge/Prosec/Pub Def 1.91 5.17
6 Consultant 4.63 1.72
7 Bus. Owner 1.09 0.00
8 Public Official or Lobbyist 0.27 0.00
9 Academics 1.23 3.45
10 Other 9.81 8.62
Notes: Includes both the national and the minority oversample. Sample restricted to associates in private firms in
wave 1.
similar. However, examining promotion into partners or movement into contract/staff attorney
positions, we note stark differences between blacks and whites. Only 7% of black associates have
made partner by Wave 2 compared to 17% of white associates. Furthermore, over 22% of associates
became contract or staff attorneys compared to 13% of whites.
When we restrict the sample to those associates who worked in a firm with 250 lawyers or more
in wave 1, the partnership rates fall for both groups and the difference in promotion rates becomes
even starker. The finding that a significantly higher fraction of black associates moved into these
fixed-term positions with no partnership chances is important, because these are associates who
chose to stay in private law yet took up positions that are less prestigious than associates. For
these attorneys, it is difficult to make the argument that low partnership rates are simply reflective
of black associates’ greater desire to leave private firms for other types of organizations.
Although Table 14 reveals large black and white differences in the likelihood of becoming a
partner from large private firms, we need to interpret the finding cautiously. Recall that a greater
fraction of black attorneys are female and work in a major city where partnership rates are lower.
Without controlling for basic demographic information and region of employment, it is difficult
to attribute these promotion rate differences to being black. The following section addresses this
concern by predicting the likelihood of partnership controlling for basic demographic variables and
regional dummies. Furthermore, our model of statistical discrimination predict these differences
will remain even controlling for observables correlates of productivity.
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7.3.3 Lower Likelihood of Partnership Among Blacks in Large Law Firms
In large private law firms, official evaluations for partnership typically occur between seven to
nine years after the associate starts at the firm. Therefore, by the time Wave 2 of the AJD was
administered, the lower end of the requisite waiting time for partnership decision had passed for
the associates who remained with the firm with which they started in 2000. However, turnover and
burnout rates at corporate law firms is notoriously high, and many associates leave before facing the
official partnership decision. Although associates’ decisions to leave the firm for an another position
can certainly be voluntary and unrelated to their prospects for partnership, early departures from
the firm are more likely reflective of the associates’ low partnership chances. While AJD asks
about the reason behind any job turnover, respondents typically cite a mixed bag of reasons that
cannot be easily sorted into voluntary choices or decisions that are colored by the respondents’ job
assignments or promotion chances.
In my analysis of promotion rates, I first choose to simply distinguish between those who
became partners (whether in the same firm as in wave 1 or different) and those who did not. In the
latter part of this paper, I check the robustness of my results by limiting my sample to only those
associates who chose to stay in a private firm. The “non-partner” group in my analysis includes
those who remained as associates, became contract or staff attorneys, or left for positions in other
types of organizations. In the data, I do not have information on the timeline for partnership at
the respondents’ firms. Therefore, this non-partner group also includes those associates who have
not yet become partners, because they have not had the chance for promotion. However, as long
as blacks are not more likely to be in firms with longer timeline for partnership, this fact should
not bias our analysis.21 In my conversations with legal professionals, they also noted that there
can be some flexibility in the timing of the partnership decision. Some associates are encouraged
to apply for partnership after the minimum number of years while others are advised to wait a few
years to build up their qualifications. Consequently, lower partnership rates among blacks at the
seven-year mark can also point to their higher time/effort cost of investment towards partnership.
Table 15 summarizes OLS results predicting the probability of partnership controlling for region,
GPA/law school rank, and a measure of the associate’s desire for partnership. The sample is limited
to those respondents who were associates in large private law firms at the time of first AJD wave.
Column (1) only controls for standard demographic variables and column (2) adds regional
dummies. Among those hired into large law firm, blacks are about 6 percentage points less likely
to have made partner seven years into their legal career. The third column controls for whether the
associate stated that he is planning to stay in his current position for five or more years. I interpret
21From my attorney interviews and readings of institutional literature, I did not get a sense that the biggest firms
in the group of large law firms have longer a timeline for partnership.
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Table 15: Determinants of Partnership in Large Law Firms
Dependent Variable =1 if current position is partner in Wave 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Black -0.059** -0.063*** -0.065*** -0.047* -0.053**
(0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021)
Hispanic -0.028 -0.015 -0.012 0.003 0.002
(0.031) (0.027) (0.030) (0.038) (0.040)
Asian 0.030 0.028 -0.012 0.037 -0.000
(0.041) (0.049) (0.039) (0.044) (0.041)
Female -0.002 -0.014 -0.022 0.000 -0.002
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027)
Age 0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Married 0.030 0.028 0.023 0.013 0.011
(0.036) (0.039) (0.040) (0.045) (0.045)
GPA=3.50 to 3.75 0.028 0.034
(0.059) (0.061)
GPA=3.25 to 3.49 0.067 0.067
(0.061) (0.065)
GPA=3.00 to 3.24 0.029 0.034
(0.068) (0.070)
GPA=2.75 to 2.99 -0.028 -0.020
(0.051) (0.052)
GPA=2.50 to 2.74 -0.003 0.004
(0.056) (0.066)
LS Rank 11 to 25 -0.040* -0.037
(0.021) (0.022)
LS Rank 26 to 100 0.039 0.026
(0.029) (0.026)
LS Rank 101 to 137 0.042 0.029
(0.073) (0.080)
LS Rank 138 to 178 0.038 0.017
(0.130) (0.131)
Plan to Stay for 5+ years 0.033 0.021
(0.050) (0.037)
N 302.000 302.000 295.000 300.000 293.000
R2 0.015 0.049 0.060 0.067 0.075
Other Controls:
Regional dummies × × × ×
Note: The exact survey question is “Over the total life of these matters, on how many of them were you involving in
formulating strategy on the matter with attorneys more senior than you and/or clients?” and ”...Assigning and/or supervising
the work of others (attorneys or paralegals)?” The sample is restricted to those who were associates in a large private law firm
in Wave 1. Standard errors are clustered at the regional level. Standard controls include dummies indicating female, Black,
Hispanic, Asian, Native/Other, age, current marital status, and whether the current job is their first job out of law school.
Race categories are adjusted for multi-ethnicity. Missing race information in the AJD survey has been updated with the
LSAC race information when available. * = different from zero at the 10% level. ** = different from zero at the 5% level. ***
= different from zero at the 1% level.
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this stated intention as a crude measure of the associate’s desire for partnership. Admittedly,
plans to stay in the firm are endogenous to the associate’s assessment of the quality of his/her
job assignment and partnership chances. And therefore, including it in the regression may lead
to an underestimation of the effect of being black on partnership. However, column (3) shows
that coefficient on the associate’s plans to stay is positive yet insignificant and, more importantly,
controlling for it does not change the coefficient on Black. This result provides some evidence
against the argument that lower partnership rates of blacks are merely reflective of differential
black and white preferences about their career paths.
The last two columns examine black and white differences in promotion rates conditional on
GPA and law school rankings, and we can see that the Black coefficient drops in magnitude. This
is expected, because a part of the explanation for lower partnership rates among hired blacks in the
model is their lower average level of qualification. However, about a 4-percentage point difference
in partnership remains even controlling for observables, and it is still statistically significant at the
1-percent level. As before, an associate’s plans to stay at the firm is not statistically significant,
and controlling for it actually increases the magnitude and significance of the Black coefficient.
Therefore, we find support for our model of statistical discrimination in which all hired blacks are
negatively colored by affirmative action at hiring.
Table A.3 in the Appendix shows the corresponding results for associates who were in firms
with less than 50 attorneys. Although still negative, the impact of being black is smaller than
in the large firm across all specifications, and none of them are statistically different from zero.
This is in line with the model’s predictions that affirmative action at hiring worsens the internal
promotion rates of blacks. If smaller firms are less likely to be lowering their hiring standards for
blacks, then the promotion chances of blacks hired into these small firms should be closer to the
promotion rates of their white peers. Furthermore, without affirmative action, hired blacks would
not be negatively stereotyped in task assignment, and they should face similar promotion rates as
whites conditional on observable signals of their productivity.
In small firms, however, being female is associated with a large decrease in the probability
of becoming a partner. This mirrors patterns we observed in task assignments and interaction
with partners where blacks faced unequal assignments in large firms while females received worse
assignments in small firms.
7.3.4 Can Task Assignment or Interaction with Partners Explain Lower Partnership
Rates?
Our theoretical model suggests that assignments into lower quality tasks or lack of partner interac-
tions should be associated with lower partnership rates for all associates whether there is affirmative
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action or not. This is because investment costs for partnership are higher in the non-promotion
track.
In Table 16, I present results from OLS regressions predicting partnership controlling for wave
1 task assignments for all associates who were working in a private firm in 2002. Conditional on the
associates’ assignment into the four desirable tasks, we find that being black is no longer significantly
associated with being a partner. However, task assignment is correlated with partnership. More
specifically, those associates who reported to be formulating strategies with partners is associated
with 7 to 9 percentage point increase in the probability of partnership. Recall from Table 9 that
this is one of the tasks with the greatest black and white differences in large firms. Furthermore,
the positive impact of strategizing with partners on partnership probabilities is much greater than
GPA and law school rankings both in magnitude and statistical significance.
The last column controls for the associate’s plans to stay for 5 or more years at the firm, which
is positively correlated with partnership. The coefficient on formulating strategies with partners
remains positive and of similar magnitude, but it is now only statistically significant at the 15
percent level. However, as aforementioned, plans to stay are likely endogenous to the quality of
tasks, and directly controlling for this variable will likely underestimate the impact of tasks on
partnership chances.22
Rather than task assignments, one can interpret the division between non-promotion and pro-
motion track as a decision to groom the associate for partnership or not. I ask whether an associate’s
social interaction with partners early on in his/her career can help predict his or her partnership
chances. Table 17 presents OLS results controlling for partner interactions rather than task assign-
ments. Across all specifications, we do not find much evidence that lunch or recreational activities
with partners has any impact on promotion probabilities. Although positive, interactions with part-
ners are associated with only a 1 to 2 percentage point increase in the probability of partnership,
and these effects are not statistically significant.
Overall, these two tables suggest that greater professional interactions with partners on the job
is a better predictor of partnership than social interactions. In other words, ultimately partners
want colleagues who can generate profit for the firm and produce good work, not those who will be
a part of the firm’s softball team. Black lawyers in large firms are assigned less substantive work,
because partners believe that they are less qualified. Therefore, with fewer opportunities to prove
themselves for partnership, blacks are less likely to be promoted than whites of similar ability.
22The main findings in Table 16 are robust to using probit or logit.
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Table 16: Tasks as Predictors of Partnership
Dependent Variable =1 if current position is partner in Wave 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Black -0.021 -0.010 -0.057 -0.060
(0.051) (0.059) (0.061) (0.063)
Hispanic -0.094** -0.046 -0.067 -0.071
(0.036) (0.032) (0.051) (0.054)
Asian -0.012 0.019 0.001 -0.007
(0.029) (0.032) (0.046) (0.045)
Female -0.062** -0.051* -0.052* -0.047*
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027)
Age -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Married 0.034 0.024 0.016 0.009
(0.028) (0.032) (0.037) (0.036)
Firm Size ≥ 250 lawyers -0.088** -0.074* -0.078** -0.074*
(0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Court appearance -0.030 -0.045 -0.023 -0.018
(0.043) (0.044) (0.059) (0.059)
Formulating strategy with partners 0.099** 0.093** 0.072* 0.070
(0.038) (0.041) (0.043) (0.048)
Traveling to meet clients and witnesses 0.004 0.015 0.004 -0.004
(0.038) (0.041) (0.043) (0.043)
Supervising attorneys and paralegals 0.034 0.024 0.034 0.031
(0.067) (0.067) (0.070) (0.066)
GPA = 3.50 to 3.74 0.033 0.051
(0.056) (0.053)
GPA = 3.25 to 3.49 -0.009 0.014
(0.051) (0.049)
GPA = 3.00 to 3.24 0.037 0.055
(0.055) (0.053)
GPA = 2.75 to 2.99 -0.010 0.016
(0.057) (0.056)
GPA = 2.50 to 2.74 -0.044 -0.003
(0.048) (0.049)
LS Rank 11 to 25 -0.025 -0.026
(0.050) (0.054)
LS Rank 26 to 100 0.054 0.035
(0.048) (0.047)
LS Rank 101 to 137 -0.008 -0.027
(0.061) (0.063)
Plan to stay for 5+ years 0.123***
(0.042)
N 618.000 618.000 557.000 545.000
R2 0.057 0.092 0.131 0.153
Other Controls:
Regional dummies × × ×
GPA/Law School Rank × ×
Notes: The sample is restricted to those who were associates in a private law firm in Wave 1. Standard errors are clustered
at the regional level. Race categories are adjusted for multi-ethnicity. Missing race information in the AJD survey has been
updated with the LSAC race information when available. * = different from zero at the 10% level. ** = different from zero at
the 5% level. *** = different from zero at the 1% level.
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Table 17: Interactions with Partners as Predictors of Partnership
Dependent Variable =1 if current position is partner in Wave 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Black -0.061 -0.052 -0.097** -0.082 -0.085
(0.043) (0.051) (0.046) (0.049) (0.050)
Hispanic -0.096** -0.055 -0.108* -0.061 -0.066
(0.044) (0.046) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057)
Asian -0.072** -0.038 -0.074 -0.032 -0.036
(0.028) (0.039) (0.043) (0.053) (0.049)
Female -0.081*** -0.072*** -0.087*** -0.075** -0.068**
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028)
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Married 0.046* 0.033 0.026 0.020 0.011
(0.024) (0.025) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
Firm Size ≥ 250 lawyers -0.106*** -0.079*** -0.111*** -0.084*** -0.071***
(0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024)
Lunch with partners 0.026 0.025 0.018 0.014 0.005
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026)
Recreational activities with partners 0.041 0.041 0.015 0.020 0.008
(0.024) (0.025) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031)
Plan to stay for 5+ years 0.114***
(0.035)
N 820.000 820.000 726.000 726.000 713.000
r2 0.060 0.092 0.094 0.128 0.145
Other Controls:
Regional dummies × × ×
GPA/Law School Rank × × ×
Note: The sample is restricted to those who were associates in a private law firm in Wave 1. Standard errors are clustered
at the regional level. Standard controls include dummies indicating female, Black, Hispanic, Asian, Native/Other, age, current
marital status, and whether the current job is their first job out of law school. All estimates are weighted using sample
probability weights adjusted for non-response. Race categories are adjusted for multi-ethnicity. Missing race information in
the AJD survey has been updated with the LSAC race information when available. * = different from zero at the 10% level.
** = different from zero at the 5% level. *** = different from zero at the 1% level.
7.3.5 Black and White Differences in Promotion Rates Conditional Task Assignment
The last two empirical predictions concern black and white differences in promotion rates condi-
tional on track assignments. In the previous section, we have seen that formulating strategies with
partners was associated with the greatest increase in partnership. Therefore, I assume that those
respondents who spend most or all of their time strategizing with partners have been assigned to
the promotion track. All others are assumed to have been in the non-promotion track.
First, conditional on having worse task assignments, blacks in large firms should have indistin-
guishable or lower promotion rates than whites. If investment cost is too high in non-promotion
track and no one invests, then both blacks and whites should have zero chance for partnership.
However, if qualified workers in the non-promotion track choose to invest, then blacks should have
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Table 18: Prediction of Partnership Conditional on Task Assignment
Dependent Variable=1 if current position is partner in Wave 2
Panel A: Non-promotion Track
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Black -0.033 -0.008 -0.009 0.000 -0.006
(0.023) (0.026) (0.032) (0.039) (0.048)
Hispanic 0.002 0.036 0.041 0.085 0.085
(0.061) (0.066) (0.071) (0.076) (0.081)
Asian 0.080 0.090 0.035 0.104* 0.047
(0.057) (0.062) (0.053) (0.055) (0.050)
Female -0.044 -0.059 -0.073** -0.050 -0.057
(0.037) (0.036) (0.032) (0.043) (0.039)
N 196.000 196.000 190.000 195.000 189.000
R2 0.034 0.093 0.111 0.159 0.178
Panel B: Promotion Track
Black -0.103* -0.048 -0.054 0.021 0.027
(0.050) (0.064) (0.068) (0.228) (0.211)
Hispanic -0.061 -0.085 -0.091 -0.016 0.021
(0.051) (0.057) (0.061) (0.089) (0.121)
Asian -0.118** -0.172 -0.176 -0.130 -0.129
(0.040) (0.123) (0.118) (0.128) (0.116)
Female 0.064 0.033 0.033 0.021 0.035
(0.058) (0.077) (0.079) (0.068) (0.082)
N 71.000 71.000 71.000 70.000 70.000
R2 0.060 0.262 0.265 0.371 0.387
Other Controls:
Standard controls: × × × × ×
Regional dummies × × ×
GPA/Law School Rank × × ×
Plan to stay for 5+ years ×
Note: “Non-promotion track” are those respondents who answered None, Some, or Half to the number of matters where
they spent formulating strategies with partners or seniors. “Promotion track” are those respondents who answered Most or
All. The sample is restricted to those who were associates in a large private law firm in Wave 1. Standard errors are clustered
at the regional level. Standard controls include dummies indicating female, Black, Hispanic, Asian, Native/Other, age, and
current marital status. Race categories are adjusted for multi-ethnicity. Missing race information in the AJD survey has been
updated with the LSAC race information when available. * = different from zero at the 10% level. ** = different from zero at
the 5% level. *** = different from zero at the 1% level.
lower promotion rates, because a greater proportion of them are unqualified. Panel A in Table 18
restricts the sample to the wave 1 associates in large private firms who were assigned to the non-
promotion track. Across all specifications, there is no difference in the promotion chances of blacks
and whites in the non-promotion track. However, females tend to have worse promotion rates than
males, which may reflect women’s greater propensity for career interruptions and departure from
the labor market.
Second, conditional on having good task assignments, it is unclear whether blacks or whites
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should have higher promotion probabilities. As we previously explained, if there are large differences
in the average qualifications of blacks and whites in the population, then the firms will set a much
higher promotion track standard for blacks. Consequently, only blacks that appear to be qualified
with a probability very close to one will be placed into the promotion track, and, in turn, they will
have higher promotion rates than whites in the same track. However, if the cost of an unqualified
worker in the promotion track is very large or very low, then it is possible for the partnership
rates of blacks in the promotion track to be similar or lower than their white peers. Panel B
restricts the sample to those respondents who spend most of their time formulating strategies with
partners. With basic demographic and regional controls (column 2), blacks in the promotion track
are less likely to be a partner, although this effect is statistically insignificant. Adding law school
controls, the black coefficient becomes positive, but this estimate is very imprecise. Overall, there is
weak evidence that blacks in the promotion track have slightly worse promotion rates than whites
performing the same type of tasks.
8 Alternative Explanations and Robustness Checks
8.1 Results driven by different career preferences of blacks and whites?
Perhaps the strongest alternative explanation for the empirical findings in this paper is the argument
that career preferences of blacks and whites might be fundamentally different. More specifically,
blacks may simply value working for prestigious firms early in their career more than whites. This
would explain the greater likelihood of highly qualified blacks to be working in large firms. If these
black lawyers do not intend to become partners but simply want to use their prestigious positions
as stepping stones for careers in other sectors, then blacks will have lower promotion rates than
whites.
While it is difficult to entirely dismiss the hypothesis that differences in preferences can ex-
plain the higher hiring and lower promotion rates of blacks, there is some evidence against this
argument. First, AJD asks about the importance of various factors in determining which job offer
the respondent decided to take. One of the listed factors is the job’s prestige, and the respondent
can rate its importance from a scale of 1 to 7 with 7 being extremely important. Table A.4 in
the Appendix shows probit results predicting the probability of working in a large firm controlling
for the respondent’s value of the job’s prestige. The coefficient on the importance of prestige is
positive and statistically significant. However, the coefficient on Black in specifications (4) through
(6) remain significant and of the same magnitude as those reported in Table 6 without prestige
controls.
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Second, if differences in promotion rates can be explained by black lawyers’ lack of desire
for partnership, we might expect to see signs of less effort among black associates in large law
firms. However, as we discussed before, Table 10 shows no clear black-white disparities in writing
for publications/seminars or participating in bar or civic associations – activities that may be
important for future business development. Moreover, I find no significant differences in billable
hours between black and white lawyers in large law firms. Table A.5 in the Appendix shows
OLS results predicting partnership controlling for task assignments and billable hours last week.
The coefficient on billable hours is small and positive and not statistically significant except in
the second regression specification with no law school controls. More importantly, “formulating
strategies with partners” is still associated with increased partnership probabilities and remains of
the same magnitude and statistical significance as in the regressions without effort controls.
8.2 Differences in Positional Rank Among Those Who Stayed in Private Firms
From Table 14, we noted that blacks associates in private firms were much more likely to have moved
into contract or staff attorney positions compared to whites. These are fixed-term positions that
are less prestigious than associates and not eligible for partnership considerations. In this section,
I divide the “non-partner” group into 3 ranked categories (staff/contract attorney, associate, and
of-counsel/supervising attorney) and focus on predicting positions of those who started and stayed
in private firms. By limiting my sample to those who chose to remain in private firms, I can further
discount the possibility that lower promotion rates among blacks might reflect their greater desire
to enter public law compared to whites.23
I estimate the following ordered probit model
y∗i = X
′
iβ + ui (15)
where the the observed category yi is defined as
yi =

1 if staff or contract attorney
2 if associate
3 if of-counsel or supervising/managing attorney
4 if partner,
and ui is standard normally distributed. Table A.6 in the Appendix examines determinants of wave
2 positions for associates who started as associates in large private firms. Blacks are much more
23Just over 80% of both whites and blacks who started as associates in a private firm stayed in a position within
a private law firm.
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likely to be in lower positions conditional on being hired and conditional on observables, including
controlling for plans to stay in the firm in the last column. Table A.7 examines whether task
assignments are associated with positional ranks within a private firm. As in our previous analysis
for partnership, we find that those associates who spent more time “formulating strategies with
partners” have assumed higher positions. These results provide additional support to the claim
that blacks in large private firms face significantly lower partnership chances, because they are
assigned to worse tasks early on in their careers.
9 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I introduce a dynamic model of statistical discrimination to understand why minori-
ties continue to be underrepresented at the top of most professional ladders despite making large
gains at hiring. I show that when affirmative action at hiring raises the hiring rates of blacks but
leaves assignment standards to the promotion-track unchanged, this divergence in strategies can
lead to lower promotion rates for blacks than had such a policy not been in place. Using data from
the After the JD study – a unique longitudinal survey that tracks the professional lives of over 4,000
lawyers who entered the bar in 2000 – I find that compared to whites of similar credentials, blacks
are more likely to be hired but are assigned to worse tasks and less likely to be a partner seven years
after entering the bar, even conditional on observable correlates of productivity. These black and
white differences in promotion rates can be explained by dissimilar task assignments received as
associates. These findings are robust to controlling for workers’ preferences for prestigious jobs and
effort as measured by billable hours. Results from this paper provide a novel explanation for the
shortage of minorities in managerial and executive ranks by revealing how lack of complementary
strategies in job assignment and promotion can counter the impact and goals of diversity programs
early in minorities’ careers.
Despite the focus on the career paths of lawyers in my empirical analysis, the general principles
and predictions that are established in the model and confirmed in data are not limited to the
legal field. An interesting example can be found in Major League Baseball (MLB). Although MLB
has been praised for its overall diversity, black representation among baseball managers is very
low. A closer look at its coaching staff reveals a pattern that cannot be detected from aggregate
numbers. In MLB’s thirty baseball teams, only 23 percent of the third-base coaches are minorities
compared to 67 percent of first-base coaches.24 It is well-known in baseball that the third-base
coaching position is more prestigious, receives better pay, and serves as a better stepping stone to a
future managerial position. Despite the significant progress MLB has made since the early 1990s in
24http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/12/sports/baseball/12baseball.html?ref=discrimination
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diversifying its coaching staff as a whole, minorities seem to be disproportionately channeled into
less demanding and prestigious roles. The disconnect between a diversity-driven hiring process and
a payoff-focused job assignment and promotion described in this paper may also help explain the
low representation of blacks among MLB managers.
Finally, although I find evidence for lower hiring standards for blacks in large law firms, control-
ling for task assignments, GPA and law school rankings have minimal impact on promotion rates
at best. Therefore, the argument that underrepresentation of minorities at the top of professional
ladders is merely a reflection of minorities’ lack of qualifications seems to be an overly simple rep-
resentation of reality. This paper suggests that rational biases against minorities can lead to worse
terms and conditions of employment that afford minorities less opportunities for advancement even
when there is an effort to increase their hiring at the beginning of their careers.
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A Appendix
A.1 After the JD Study
The creation of a nationally representative sample involved a two-step process. In the first stage,
the AJD divided the nation into eighteen strata by region and size of the new lawyer population.
Within each stratum, one primary sampling unit (PSU) was chosen. A PSU can be a metropolitan
area, portion of a state outside large metropolitan areas, or the entire state. The PSUs included
the four “major” markets (i.e. those with more than 2,000 new lawyers): Chicago, Los Angeles,
New York City, and Washington D.C.; five of the nine “large” markets (i.e. those with 750 to
2,000 new lawyers); and nine of the remaining smaller markets. In the second stage, the AJD
researchers sampled individuals from each of the PSUs at rates, when combined, would represent
the national population of lawyers. They also included an oversample of 1,465 new lawyers from
minority groups (Black, Hispanic, and Asian American), yielding a final sample of 9,192 lawyers in
the eighteen PSUs.
Unfortunately, the AJD researchers could not locate 20% of the sample and roughly 20% of
those located were identified as lawyers moving from one state bar to another rather than lawyers
entering the bar for the first time. The researchers chose to keep these movers in the sample so
long as they graduated from law school no earlier than 1998. About 6% of the AJD sample began
law practice in 1999, and 1.5% began law practice in 1998. From those in the original sample who
were located, 71% responded either to the mail questionnaire or to a telephone interview, yielding
a total of 4,538 valid responses which accounts for about 10% of the bar admittances in 2000.
Of these, 3,905 individuals composed the nationally representative sample, while 633 respondents
corresponded to the minority oversample.
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A.2 Additional Figures and Tables
Figure A.1: Diversity Score Card of Law Firms 2010
Source: The Diversity Score Card 2010. Retrieved October 22, 2010 from
http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202444469087&src=EMC-Email&et=editorial&bu=The%20American%
20Lawyer&pt=Am%20Law%20Daily&cn=am_law_daily_20100301&kw=The%20Chart
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Figure A.2: GPA Distribution of Black and White Lawyers by Organization
Notes: All graphs include the minority over-sample. Race categories are adjusted for multi-ethnicity. Missing race
information in the AJD survey has been updated with the LSAC race information when available. Large private
firms are those firms with greater or equal to 250 lawyers. Small firms are firms with less than 50 lawyers.
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Table A.1: Predicted Probability of Working in A Small Firm
by GPA and LS Rank: Black minus White
Law School Ranking
1 to 10 11 to 20 21 to 100 101 to 137 138 to 178
1 to 10 11 to 20 21 to 100 101 to 137 138 to 178
GPA=3.75 to 4.00 -0.0937** -0.158** -0.358*** -0.0937** -0.586***
(0.0382) (0.0624) (0.0716) (0.0382) (0.105)
GPA=3.50 to 3.74 -0.0745 -0.111* -0.0877 -0.0115 -0.032
(0.0462) (0.0637) (0.153) (0.0848) (0.161)
GPA=3.25 to 3.49 -0.128** -0.180** -0.165 -0.0545 -0.0979
(0.0499) (0.0879) (0.167) (0.107) (0.149)
GPA=3.00 to 3.24 -0.221** -0.265** -0.159 -0.0813 -0.0663
(0.095) (0.106) (0.127) (0.138) (0.0805)
GPA=2.75 to 2.99 -0.0612 -0.0465 0.0628 0.167 0.0447
(0.137) (0.141) (0.0658) (0.161) (0.035)
GPA=2.50 to 2.74 -0.0165 -0.00376 0.12 0.201 0.0959
(0.269) (0.287) (0.24) (0.275) (0.12)
Notes: Race categories are adjusted for multi-ethnicity. Missing race information in the AJD survey have been updated with
the LSAC race information when available. Standard errors reported in parentheses have been calculated using the Delta
method. Predicted probabilities are for male, 31 years old, married, first job, no law review, Atlanta. Reported in brackets are
the proportion of black lawyers working in private law firms belonging to each GPA-law school rank cell. * = different from
zero at the 10% level. ** = different from zero at the 5% level. *** = different from zero at the 1% level.
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Table A.2: Desirable Task Assignments in Small Private Firms (OLS Results)
Dependent Variable=1 if “most” or “all”
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Formulating strategy with partners/seniors
Black -0.045 -0.012 0.013 -0.335
(0.072) (0.097) (0.091) (0.401)
Hispanic 0.146 0.162* 0.193* 0.163
(0.090) (0.086) (0.093) (0.202)
Asian -0.066 -0.115 -0.082 -0.351**
(0.104) (0.090) (0.104) (0.157)
Female -0.090* -0.088 -0.100* 0.160
(0.049) (0.052) (0.056) (0.109)
Panel B: Assigning and/or supervising attorneys or paralegals
Black 0.011 -0.011 -0.030 0.165
(0.067) (0.080) (0.074) (0.287)
Hispanic -0.072* -0.063 -0.080* 0.061
(0.036) (0.044) (0.042) (0.117)
Asian -0.059 -0.100 -0.079 -0.144
(0.077) (0.061) (0.077) (0.120)
Female -0.075*** -0.079*** -0.077** 0.065
(0.019) (0.022) (0.029) (0.087)
N 578 545 545 163
Other Controls:
School Rank/Performance × × ×
Regional dummies × × ×
Area of Law ×
Note: The exact survey question is “Over the total life of these matters, on how many of them were you involving in
formulating strategy on the matter with attorneys more senior than you and/or clients?” and ”...Assigning and/or supervising
the work of others (attorneys or paralegals)?” A small private law firm is defined as a firm with less than 50 lawyers.
Standard errors are clustered at the regional level. Standard controls include dummies indicating female, Black, Hispanic,
Asian, Native/Other, age, current marital status, and whether the current job is their first job out of law school. All estimates
are weighted using sample probability weights adjusted for non-response. Race categories are adjusted for multi-ethnicity.
Missing race information in the AJD survey has been updated with the LSAC race information when available. * = different
from zero at the 10% level. ** = different from zero at the 5% level. *** = different from zero at the 1% level.
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Table A.3: Determinants of Partnership in Small Law Firms
Dependent Variable =1 if current position is partner in Wave 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Black -0.069 -0.051 -0.046 -0.018 -0.024
(0.080) (0.093) (0.096) (0.098) (0.101)
Hispanic -0.115* -0.038 -0.039 -0.033 -0.036
(0.054) (0.057) (0.063) (0.061) (0.067)
Asian -0.091* -0.003 0.000 0.002 0.006
(0.048) (0.050) (0.044) (0.067) (0.058)
Female -0.113*** -0.098** -0.083** -0.110*** -0.092**
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037)
Age -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Married 0.080** 0.054 0.040 0.044 0.031
(0.030) (0.037) (0.039) (0.043) (0.043)
GPA = 3.5 to 3.74 -0.014 -0.001
(0.117) (0.111)
GPA = 3.250 to 3.49 -0.074 -0.053
(0.082) (0.084)
GPA = 3.00 to 3.24 -0.079 -0.052
(0.074) (0.071)
GPA = 2.75 to 2.99 -0.142 -0.104
(0.090) (0.091)
GPA = 2.50 to 2.74 -0.189* -0.144
(0.100) (0.107)
GPA = 2.25 to 2.49 -0.110 -0.043
(0.188) (0.190)
GPA < 2.25 -0.191* -0.250**
(0.101) (0.096)
Law School Rank 11 to 25 -0.123 -0.132
(0.219) (0.205)
Law School Rank 26 to 100 0.001 -0.017
(0.216) (0.201)
Law School Rank 101 to 137 -0.066 -0.068
(0.211) (0.193)
Law School Rank 138 to 178 -0.088 -0.102
(0.223) (0.209)
Plan to stay for 5+ years 0.131*** 0.120**
(0.041) (0.047)
N 448.000 448.000 438.000 445.000 435.000
R2 0.045 0.110 0.127 0.152 0.163
Other Controls:
Regional dummies × × ×
GPA × ×
Plans to Stay ×
Note: The exact survey question is “Over the total life of these matters, on how many of them were you involving in
formulating strategy on the matter with attorneys more senior than you and/or clients?” and ”...Assigning and/or supervising
the work of others (attorneys or paralegals)?” The sample is restricted to those who were associates in a private law firm with
less than 50 lawyers in Wave 1. Standard errors are clustered at the regional level. Standard controls include dummies
indicating female, Black, Hispanic, Asian, Native/Other, age, current marital status, and whether the current job is their job
out of law school. All estimates are weighted using sample probability weights adjusted for non-response. Race categories are
adjusted for multi-ethnicity. Missing race information in the AJD survey has been updated with the LSAC race information
when available. * = different from zero at the 10% level. ** = different from zero at the 5% level. *** = different from zero at
the 1% level.
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Table A.4: Probability of Working in A Large Private Law Firm Controlling for Prestige Importance
Dependent Variable=1 if Current Firm Size ≥ 250 lawyers
Excluded Categories: Male, White, GPA=3.74 to 4.0, Tier 1 LS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Black -0.144 -0.103 -0.258 6.278*** 6.019*** 7.349***
(0.158) (0.162) (0.157) (0.898) (0.563) (0.468)
Hispanic -0.089 0.078 -0.095 -0.674* -0.900** -1.786**
(0.141) (0.167) (0.155) (0.358) (0.406) (0.796)
Asian 0.271** 0.087 -0.089 -1.043 -0.731 -0.641
(0.135) (0.129) (0.102) (1.040) (1.003) (1.143)
Female 0.083 0.097 0.054 0.095 0.064 0.073
(0.082) (0.083) (0.076) (0.083) (0.079) (0.078)
Age -0.022** -0.005 -0.011 -0.005 -0.011 -0.010
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012)
Married -0.068 -0.062 0.048 -0.070 0.035 0.015
(0.066) (0.076) (0.079) (0.069) (0.075) (0.073)
First Job 0.453*** 0.395*** 0.461*** 0.389*** 0.450*** 0.469***
(0.075) (0.096) (0.095) (0.096) (0.094) (0.099)
Importance of Prestige 0.205*** 0.147*** 0.149*** 0.145*** 0.149*** 0.149***
(0.022) (0.024) (0.029) (0.024) (0.030) (0.031)
N 1776.000 1688.000 1688.000 1666.000 1666.000 1650.000
School Rank/Performance × × × × ×
Regional dummies × × ×
Race × GPA × × ×
Race × LS Rank ×
Notes: The sample is restricted to those working in private law firms. A “large private law firm” is defined as a firm with 250
or more lawyers. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the regional level. All estimates are weighted
using sample probability weights adjusted for non-response. Race categories are adjusted for multi-ethnicity. Missing race
information in the AJD survey has been updated with the LSAC race information when available. Importance of Prestige is a
variable ranging from 1 (Not at all important) to 7 (Extremely important) to the question, “Comparing specific job offers you
received from employers you considered, how important were the following factors in making your choice? Prestige.” * =
different from zero at the 10% level. ** = different from zero at the 5% level. *** = different from zero at the 1% level.
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Table A.5: Tasks as Predictors of Partnership Controlling for Hours Worked
Dependent Variable =1 if current position is partner in Wave 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Black -0.013 0.007 -0.040 -0.019
(0.050) (0.056) (0.048) (0.057)
Hispanic -0.118*** -0.077* -0.146*** -0.100*
(0.035) (0.043) (0.048) (0.055)
Asian -0.013 0.022 -0.037 -0.008
(0.033) (0.039) (0.045) (0.047)
Female -0.055* -0.042 -0.060* -0.047
(0.027) (0.026) (0.029) (0.028)
Age -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Married 0.036 0.023 0.028 0.021
(0.030) (0.031) (0.035) (0.038)
Firm Size ≥ 250 lawyers -0.105*** -0.079** -0.113*** -0.088**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
Court Appearance 0.031 0.024 0.043 0.034
(0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026)
Formulating strategy with partners 0.095** 0.087** 0.082* 0.069
(0.035) (0.038) (0.039) (0.042)
Traveling to meet clients and witnesses -0.031 -0.032 -0.055 -0.048
(0.040) (0.042) (0.047) (0.047)
Supervising attorneys and paralegals -0.027 -0.025 -0.016 -0.014
(0.059) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060)
Billable Hours 0.001 0.002* 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 608.000 608.000 546.000 546.000
R2 0.067 0.110 0.096 0.141
Other Controls:
Regional dummies × ×
GPA and Law School Rank × ×
Note: The sample is restricted to those who were associates in a private law firm in Wave 1. Standard errors are clustered
at the regional level. Standard controls include dummies indicating female, Black, Hispanic, Asian, Native/Other, age, current
marital status, and whether the current job is their first job out of law school. Race categories are adjusted for
multi-ethnicity. Missing race information in the AJD survey has been updated with the LSAC race information when
available. Billable Hours last week (Actual) is the response to the question “How many hours did you actually work last week
even if it was atypical (including evenings and weekends worked.)” * = different from zero at the 10% level. ** = different
from zero at the 5% level. *** = different from zero at the 1% level.
61
Job Assignment and Promotion Under Statistical Discrimination Jee-Yeon K. Lehmann
Table A.6: Determinants of Positions in A Large Private Firm (Ordered Probit Results)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Black -0.597*** -0.556*** -0.537** -0.557**
(0.106) (0.130) (0.219) (0.247)
Hispanic 0.040 0.258 0.436** 0.478*
(0.171) (0.214) (0.216) (0.253)
Asian -0.338 -0.195 0.031 -0.151
(0.245) (0.303) (0.246) (0.268)
Age -0.026 -0.036* -0.041** -0.050***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017)
Married 0.361** 0.360** 0.245 0.250
(0.150) (0.156) (0.204) (0.208)
Female -0.246 -0.430** -0.484** -0.539**
(0.239) (0.215) (0.232) (0.234)
Plan to stay for 5+ years 0.610***
(0.222)
N 230.000 230.000 228.000 224.000
Other Controls:
Regional dummies × ×
GPA and Law School Rank × ×
Note: Dependent variable is equal to 1 if staff/contract attorney, 2 if associate, 3 if of-counsel/supervising/managing
attorney, and 4 if partner. The sample is restricted to those who were associates in a large private law firm in Wave 1.
Standard errors are clustered at the regional level. Standard controls include dummies indicating female, Black, Hispanic,
Asian, Native/Other, age, current marital status, and whether the current job is their first job out of law school. Race
categories are adjusted for multi-ethnicity. Missing race information in the AJD survey has been updated with the LSAC race
information when available. * = different from zero at the 10% level. ** = different from zero at the 5% level. *** = different
from zero at the 1% level.
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Table A.7: Tasks as Determinants of Positions in A Private Firm (Ordered Probit Results)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Black -0.398* -0.441* -0.863*** -0.823**
(0.213) (0.264) (0.330) (0.344)
Hispanic -0.229 -0.029 -0.127 -0.119
(0.187) (0.189) (0.252) (0.270)
Asian -0.157 -0.105 -0.178 -0.200
(0.135) (0.205) (0.209) (0.214)
Female -0.307*** -0.285*** -0.335*** -0.337***
(0.102) (0.102) (0.111) (0.117)
Age -0.016* -0.019* -0.023** -0.027**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Married 0.176 0.146 0.082 0.062
(0.143) (0.160) (0.179) (0.175)
Firm Size ≥ 250 lawyers -0.394*** -0.381*** -0.389*** -0.370***
(0.140) (0.140) (0.130) (0.134)
Court appearance -0.026 -0.044 -0.090 -0.078
(0.185) (0.177) (0.245) (0.252)
Formulating strategies with partners 0.401*** 0.371** 0.340* 0.318
(0.127) (0.150) (0.193) (0.195)
Traveling to meet clients and witnesses 0.082 0.160 0.112 0.096
(0.132) (0.142) (0.172) (0.172)
Supervising attorneys/paralegals 0.039 -0.014 -0.017 -0.034
(0.290) (0.288) (0.278) (0.270)
Plan to stay 5+ years 0.395***
(0.132)
N 461.000 461.000 412.000 406.000
Other Controls:
Regional dummies × ×
GPA and Law School Rank × ×
Note: Dependent variable is equal to 1 if staff/contract attorney, 2 if associate, 3 if of-counsel/supervising/managing
attorney, and 4 if partner. The sample is restricted to those who were associates in a private law firm in Wave 1. Standard
errors are clustered at the regional level. Standard controls include dummies indicating female, Black, Hispanic, Asian,
Native/Other, age, current marital status, and whether the current job is their first job out of law school. Race categories are
adjusted for multi-ethnicity. Missing race information in the AJD survey has been updated with the LSAC race information
when available. * = different from zero at the 10% level. ** = different from zero at the 5% level. *** = different from zero at
the 1% level.
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